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LEGALIZATION CONFLICTS AND RELIANCE 
DEFENSES 
MARY D. FAN

 
ABSTRACT 
This Article addresses an open question of pressing practical import—
whether people and businesses operating in the shadow of a legalization 
conflict have a reliance defense. A legalization conflict arises when 
conduct is decriminalized by one authority while remaining criminalized 
under another legal regime. For example, drugs, guns, undocumented 
immigrants, and giving legal advice or financial support for certain 
activities, may be both illegal and legal under conflicting regimes. People 
plan their lives, hopes, and financial affairs around legalization laws and 
decrees. If people take actions now in reliance, will they face sanctions 
later? The question is of great import for many people and businesses, as 
well as the lawyers who advise them.  
The Article argues that reliance defenses should be available when 
governmental actors in charge of enforcing the criminal regime expressly 
acquiesce in the competing legalization. In such cases, reliance is 
reasonable and estoppel is required lest people or businesses be lulled by 
the statements of actors charged with administering the law into a snare of 
sanctions. Potential objections regarding privileging governmental 
lawlessness and the danger of giving people a normative choice of law 
that enables strategic gamesmanship are addressed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Legalization conflicts are proliferating. Drugs, guns, undocumented 
immigrants, giving legal advice or financial support to facilitate certain 
activities, and more may be both illegal and legal within the same space.
1
 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., Montana Firearms Freedom Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-20-104 (2009) (nullifying 
federal firearms laws in Montana), invalidated by Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, 727 F.3d 
975, 982-83 (9th Cir. 2013); State and Federal Marijuana Laws Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
113th Cong. 1 (2013) (opening statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on Judiciary) 
(stating that new recreational marijuana legalization laws “are just the latest examples of the growing 
tension between Federal and state marijuana laws, and they underscore the persistent uncertainty about 
how such conflicts will be resolved”); Julia Preston & John H. Cushman, Jr., Obama to Permit Young 
Migrants to Remain in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2012, at A1 (reporting on President Obama’s 
executive action permitting more than 800,000 “young illegal immigrants to come out of the shadows, 
work legally and obtain driver’s licenses and many other documents they have lacked” and “remain in 
the country without fear of deportation”); Michael D. Shear, Obama, Daring Congress, Acts to 
Overhaul Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2014, at A1 (reporting on President’s Obama use of an 
executive order to allow an estimated 4 million undocumented immigrants who are parents of U.S. 
citizens or lawful permanent residents to work with executive authorization); Ashley Southall, 
Answers Sought for When Marijuana Laws Collide, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2013, at A18 (detailing 
uncertainty faced by financial institutions, landlords, security providers, and other individuals and 
entities due to the conflict in marijuana legalization and criminalization laws).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/6
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The clashing permissions and prohibitions can arise from overlapping 
governing authorities and laws with competing normative visions of what 
should be criminalized or authorized.
2
 These legalization-criminalization 
conflicts create a jungle gym structure of laws that can allow for strategic 
maneuvering by the savvy—and traps for the unwary or confused.3 The 
conflicts also create a welter of questions for the courts, law enforcers, and 
people subject to the laws.  
Consider, for example, some of these puzzles. If you grow or smoke 
marijuana in a legalization state, do you have a defense based on reliance 
on state legalization and licensing if prosecuted by federal authorities?
4
 If 
banks lend to state-licensed marijuana businesses or law firms provide 
legal services to such start-ups, is there a safe harbor against federal 
sanctions for facilitating unlawful activity because of state legalization and 
licensing?
5
 If a presidential administration states it will not prosecute 
conduct legal under state law, do people or entities acting in reliance have 
a defense in a criminal prosecution by that administration or a subsequent 
one?
6
  
If you are in one of the nine states thus far to pass laws nullifying 
federal firearms law, do you have a reliance defense if prosecuted for 
possession, distribution, or manufacturing of firearms in violation of 
federal law?
7
 Should it make a legal difference when it comes to reliance-
 
 
 2. See infra Part II for a taxonomy. 
 3. See infra Part I for a discussion of illustrations. 
 4. See, e.g., Brady Dennis, Obama Administration Will Not Block State Marijuana Laws if 
Distribution Is Regulated, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/ 
health-science/obama-administration-will-not-preempt-state-marijuana-laws--for-now/2013/08/29/b725 
bfd8-10bd-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/W68P-THL7 (discussing 
legalization and prosecution questions); Will DOJ Fight Marijuana Law?, NBC NEWS (Dec. 6, 2012), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/video/nightly-news/50110375#50110375 (discussing open questions after 
the passage of recreational marijuana legalization). 
 5. See, e.g., Southall, supra note 1 (discussing questions facing banks). 
 6. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1084, 1090–1100 (D. Mont. 
2012) (grappling with the question); Dennis, supra note 4 (discussing acquiescence under Obama 
administration); Serge F. Kovaleski, Banks Say No to Marijuana Money, Legal or Not, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 12, 2014, at A1, A4 (reporting on banks’ concerns over prosecution for aiding and abetting a 
criminal enterprise); Pete Williams, Out of the ‘Shadows’: Pot Sellers Can Now Do Business with 
Banks, NBC NEWS (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/out-shadows-pot-sellers-
can-now-do-business-banks-n30661 (discussing Attorney General’s guidance to banks to give greater 
confidence to lend to state-legalized marijuana businesses). See also United States v. Schafer, 625 F.3d 
629, 637 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting defendants’ argument that law enforcement agents lulled them into 
believing their medical marijuana grow operation was legal was a question for the jury). 
 7. ALASKA STAT. § 44.99.500 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3114 (2014) (West); Idaho 
Firearms Freedom Act, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3315A (2014); Kansas Second Amendment Protection 
Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-1201 to 50-1211 (2013); Montana Firearms Freedom Act, MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 30-20-104 (2009), invalidated by Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975, 982-
83 (9th Cir. 2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-35-2 (2014); Tennessee Firearms Freedom Act, TENN. 
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based defenses that federal authorities have refused to acquiesce in 
firearms legalization regimes conflicting with federal law?
8
  
What happens to all the undocumented youths dubbed DREAMers who 
revealed their identities and locations when applying for President 
Obama’s grant of deferred action on deportation?9 When the presidential 
administration changes or if Congress overrides the nonenforcement 
policy, can the information applicants supplied in their application be used 
to hunt them down for deportation—or even prosecution for illegal 
entry?
10
 Similarly, if undocumented parents of U.S. citizens step out of the 
shadows to apply for work authorization under President Obama’s 
executive order, can the information revealed in their applications later be 
used against them if the political administration changes?
 11
 
These questions from different areas of human and commercial activity 
share a common core—a legalization conflict. A legalization conflict 
arises when conduct is decriminalized or permitted by one authority while 
 
 
CODE ANN. §§ 4-54-102 to 4-54-106 (2014); Utah State-Made Firearms Protection Act, UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 53-5b-101 to 53-5b-202 (LexisNexis 2014); Wyoming Firearms Freedom Act, WYO. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 6-8-401 to 6-8-406 (2014).  
 8. E.g., Open Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & 
Explosives to All Kan. Fed. Firearms Licensees (July 8, 2013), available at https://www.atf.gov/ 
sites/default/files/assets/pdf-files/open-letter-to-all-kansas-federal-firearms-licensees-provides-guidance-
regarding-the-kansas-second-amendment-protection-act.pdf, archived at http://perma. cc/AVM9-447R; 
Open Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives to All 
Wyo. Fed. Firearms Licensees (May 28, 2010), available at http://www.atf.gov/press/releases/ 
2010/05/052810-openletter-ffl-wyoming-legislation.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ QZ4H-6LUC; 
Open Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives to All 
Tennessee Federal Firearms Licensees (July 16, 2009), available at http://www.atf.gov/ 
files/press/releases/2009/07/071609-openletter-ffl-tennessee-legislation.pdf, archived at http://perma. 
cc/G2YY-B34L; Open Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & 
Explosives to All Montana Federal Firearms Licensees (July 16, 2009) [hereinafter ATF Letter to 
Mont.], available at http://www.atf.gov/files/press/releases/2009/07/071609-openletter-ffl-montana-
legislation.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/72E-UA5K.  
 9. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V. 
Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, Customs & Border Prot., et al. (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter Napolitano 
Letter], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-
individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/YJ3M-FNZU; I-821D, 
Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (June 
25, 2013) [hereinafter USCIS DACA Consideration], http://www.uscis.gov/i-821d, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8HVY-KKJN.  
 10. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (June 5, 2014) 
[hereinafter USCIS FAQs], http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-child 
hood-arrivals-process/frequently-asked-questions, archived at http://perma.cc/EY32-9RGS (discussing 
the frequently asked question about whether information revealed by people applying for deferred 
action can be used again the petitioner and the petitioner’s family).  
 11. See U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Executive Actions on Immigration (Dec. 5, 
2014), available at http://www.uscis.gov/immigrationaction#2 (discussing President Obama’s 
November 2014 deferred action for parents of U.S. citizens and permanent residents).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/6
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remaining criminalized under another concurrent legal regime.
12
 The 
conflicts can arise from contradictory permissions and prohibitions issued 
by countries, states, counties, cities, and other governing authorities.
13
 
Within the same level of government, different branches and actors can 
send clashing messages about legality and enforcement policy. While 
scholars are drawn to the federalism and preemption issues that can arise 
from clashing laws,
14
 people living under these laws have more immediate 
concerns—when can reliance on legalization be a defense against criminal 
liability under a competing regime? This question is increasingly 
important as more legalization conflicts are arising—sometimes even with 
the acquiescence of entities in charge of the competing criminalization 
regime.
15
 Even at this early stage, some of the people lulled by legalization 
into acting in reliance are already facing prosecution and courts must 
decide whether they have a defense.
16
 
Legalization conflicts are different than those covered by traditional 
conflicts of law. Traditionally, conflicts of laws dealt with choice of law or 
recognition of judgment questions involving events or persons with ties to 
more than one state.
17
 For example, when citizens of different states sue 
each other for events happening in a third state, which state’s law should 
control?
18
 Much of conflicts analysis is focused on civil procedure, 
jurisdiction, and private-law issues such as contract enforcement and 
 
 
 12. This Article will also refer to legalization conflicts as decriminalization conflicts and 
legalization-criminalization conflicts. 
 13. See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, Cannabis Legal, Localities Begin to Just Say No, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
27, 2014, at A1 (discussing conflicting local ordinances enacted in opposition to state legalization of 
recreational marijuana possession and licensed growing and retailing); Seattle and Pierce County 
Draw Restrictions on Pot Use, Businesses, OREGONIAN, Dec. 25, 2013, at E1 (reporting about possible 
legal challenges arising from a conflict between a county ordinance barring state-licensed marijuana 
operations and a city law imposing a fine for public marijuana use and state law legalizing recreational 
marijuana possession and licensing marijuana retailers). 
 14. E.g., Sam Kamin, Medical Marijuana in Colorado and the Future of Marijuana Regulation 
in the United States, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 147, 158–65 (2012); Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under 
the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 7–31 (2013); David S. Schwartz, 
High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 
CARDOZO L. REV. 567, 569–88 (2013).  
 15. See discussion infra Parts I.B.1–3, II. 
 16. E.g., United States v. Washington, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1084, 1090–100 (D. Mont. 2012); 
Mont. Caregivers Ass’n v. United States, 841 F.Supp. 2d 1147, 1148–49 (D. Mont. 2012); United 
States v. Janetski, No. 11-37-M-DWM, Doc. No. 45, at 6 (D. Mont. Sept. 1, 2011).  
 17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (1971); ROBERT L. FELIX & RALPH U. 
WHITTEN, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW §§ 2, 7 (6th ed. 2011).  
 18. 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 1.1–1.2 (1935). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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torts.
19
 To the extent criminal law issues are considered at all, the focus is 
generally on the classic questions of what happens when a crime or 
criminal crosses state lines.
20
 By contrast, at stake in legalization conflicts 
is not choice of law but rather reliance on the law.  
This Article tackles the question of reliance defenses that are arising 
because of the welter of contemporary legalization conflicts. In addition to 
these criminal law questions, the Article also addresses conflicts between 
immigration-related legal sanctions and executive enforcement clemency 
because of the rise in criminal sanctions for immigration offenses.
21
 The 
Article argues that reliance defenses should be available when the entity 
charged with enforcing the criminalization regime acquiesces in the 
competing legalization regime. If enforcers of the controlling criminal 
regime expressly acquiesce to a rebellious legalization scheme they may 
not later spring upon hapless people simply relying on the laws on the 
books or executive decrees. This Article also argues that the reliance 
defense for conduct during the period of acquiescence survives a change in 
the law enforcement administration.  
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses how contemporary 
decriminalization conflicts are a challenge for traditional mistake-of-law 
doctrine and highlights the need for guidance in this uncertain terrain. This 
Part discusses three examples of contemporary conflicts involving 
marijuana, guns, and immigration that are raising an array of questions for 
courts, law enforcement, and people and businesses. The three case studies 
also illustrate the factors that can make a reliance case stronger or 
untenable. The marijuana example illustrates a situation of express state 
decriminalization coupled with acquiescence by the enforcers of the 
federal criminal regime.
22
 State nullification laws on firearms are an 
 
 
 19. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 cmt. a (1971). Cf. BEALE, supra 
note 18, § 1.9 (noting debate whether criminal law should even be included in conflicts analysis 
because criminal law is part of public rather than private law).  
 20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 85 cmt. b, illus. 3 (1971); BEALE, supra 
note 18, § 1.9; FELIX & WHITTEN, supra note 17, §§ 2, 7. See also John Bernard Corr, Criminal 
Procedure and the Conflict of Laws, 73 GEO. L.J. 1217, 1217–21 (1985) (focusing on People v. 
Douglas, 123 Misc. 2d 75 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984), and the question of what happens when the law 
enforcement agency capturing a fleeing suspect is in a jurisdiction with different rules about Miranda 
advisals and interrogations without an attorney than the place of the crime and trial). 
 21. The increasing entanglement of formally civil immigration law and criminal law has given 
rise to a new term for the odd beast—crimmigration. For a discussion, see, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, A 
Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1574 (2010); Mary Fan, The Case for Crimmigration Reform, 92 N.C. L. 
REV. 75, 80–81, 116–132 (2013); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and 
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 372–73, 376 (2006). 
 22. See discussion infra Part I.B.1. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/6
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example of federal enforcers vigorously refusing to acquiesce in rebellious 
state decriminalization.
 23
 The dilemma facing DREAMers in the 
immigration context illustrates the harder case where no legislature has 
expressly decriminalized conduct and people are instead seeking to claim 
reliance on an executive decree of nonenforcement.
24
  
Part II argues that reliance on legalization should be a defense in cases 
of acquiescence by entities charged with enforcing the competing 
criminalization regime. The defense for conduct during the period of law 
enforcement acquiescence must outlast a change in administration. Law 
enforcers cannot lull people or businesses into reasonable reliance only to 
later attack, citing a regime change.  
Part III addresses potential objections regarding privileging 
governmental lawlessness or giving people and businesses a normative 
choice of law that enables strategic gamesmanship.  
I. REBELLIOUS DECRIMINALIZATION AND RELIANCE DILEMMAS  
For people and businesses operating in the shadow of a legalization 
conflict, the dilemma is whether one can rely on the decriminalization.
25
 
Of course, if a superior authority invalidates a criminal law and a 
recalcitrant jurisdiction keeps the criminal law on the books, then people 
cannot reasonably rely on the legalization. For example, when the 
Supreme Court ruled anti-sodomy criminal statutes unconstitutional in 
Lawrence v. Texas,
26
 prosecutors in Louisiana rejected police attempts to 
initiate cases for same-sex “carnal copulation” under state criminal laws 
still on the books because the criminalization was invalid.
27
 The more 
difficulty question typically arises when the legalization is by an entity 
that does not have authority to override the competing criminalization.
28
 
The legalization law or decree that conflicts with the criminalization 
regime remains in place unless and until challenged and invalidated.  
Such legalization-criminalization conflicts generate a conundrum: 
when can you rely on the decriminalization law on the books? In 
particular, when the authority charged with enforcing the competing 
 
 
 23. See discussion infra Part I.B.2. 
 24. See discussion infra Part I.B.3. 
 25. See, e.g., sources and discussion supra notes 4–10 and infra Part I.B.1–3. 
 26. 539 U.S. 558, 577–79 (2003). 
 27. Jim Mustian, Gays in Baton Rouge Arrested Under Invalid Sodomy Law, BATON ROUGE 
ADVOCATE (July 28, 2013), http://theadvocate.com/news/6580728-123/gays-in-baton-rouge-arrested, 
archived at http://perma.cc/7XWF-KLK3. 
 28. See discussion of examples infra Part I.B.1–3. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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criminalization law acquiesces in the decriminalization by the formally 
subordinate regime, can people claim reasonable reliance? This section 
explains how traditional positions on mistake-of-law doctrine and its 
reasonable reliance exception need to be updated for contemporary 
challenges. There is a need to systematically address when reliance 
defenses should be available. Three contemporary legalization-
criminalization conflicts are detailed to illustrate the dilemmas. 
A. Not Grandpa’s Mistake-of-Law 
Until a conflicting legalization law or decision is overruled—or at least 
challenged—can people rely on the decriminalization? The venerable old 
rule is that ignorance of the law is no excuse, minted in the Latin maxim 
ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
29
 A.T.H. Smith wryly noted that this 
maxim has an “almost mystical power . . . over the judicial imagination.”30 
People bear the burden of knowing what the law is despite the increasing 
mass of criminal statutes on the books regulating increasingly minute 
aspects of existence and conduct.
31
 Justice Joseph Story explained the 
formal rationales for the hard-line stance in Barlow v. United States, a tax 
fraud and forfeiture case.
32
 Ignorance or mistake of law is ordinarily no 
defense because of: (1) the practical challenge in determining whether 
someone is genuinely ignorant or simply trying to evade liability; (2) “the 
extreme danger of allowing such excuses to be set up for illegal acts to the 
detriment of the public;” and (3) the need to put people “upon extreme 
vigilance” against violation of the law.33 
When it comes to decriminalization dilemmas, however, ignorance of 
the law is not the problem. People know very well what the law states and 
are in fact relying on it.
34
 Indeed, laws or administrative decisions clashing 
with the status quo are often trumpeted with fanfare because protest is part 
 
 
 29. For a history see, e.g., Edwin R. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 
HARV. L. REV. 75, 76–83 (1908). For a comparative perspective, see ANNEMIEKE VAN VERSEVELD, 
MISTAKE OF LAW: EXCUSING PERPETRATORS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIME 10 (2012). 
 30. A. T. H. Smith, Error and Mistake of Law in Anglo-American Criminal Law, 14 ANGLO-AM. 
L. REV. 3, 16 (1985). 
 31. For a legal-realist critique of the patent fiction of the presumption under modern conditions 
of a proliferation of statutes, see, e.g., JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 376–
78 (2d ed. 1960). 
 32. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 404 (1833). 
 33. Id. at 411. 
 34. See discussion of examples infra Part I.B.1–3. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/6
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of the point.
35
 The clash is meant to send a message, such as telling the 
federal government to keep its “hands off” people’s firearms.36 A 
rebellious state may vocally aim to lead the “push to repeal federal 
prohibition” of marijuana.37 A rebellious President may use executive law 
enforcement discretion to achieve results stymied in Congress in protest 
over legislative deadlock.
38
  
In legal doctrine and scholarship, ignorance of the law and mistake of 
the law are often used interchangeably.
39
 Formally, however, there is a 
difference between ignorance and mistake of law—one implies lack of 
knowledge of the law while the other entails some knowledge, albeit 
incorrect.
40
 The notion of mistake might at first blush seem to be a better 
fit for people faced with a decriminalization conflict. But mistaken 
understandings of what the law commands in the traditional sense are not 
at issue. People living in decriminalization conflict zones are correct about 
what the law is saying—they are just caught between two laws speaking 
simultaneously.  
Customarily, mistake-of-law claims involve defendants wrong about 
the scope of the criminalization.
41
 The classic mistake-of-law case People 
v. Marrero,
42
 taught in classrooms around the country, is often used to 
illustrate this point.
43
 Marrero involved a prison guard who carried his 
unlicensed firearm in a nightclub believing he fell under the “peace 
 
 
 35. E.g., Dan Turner, Marijuana Legalization: States Send Message, Feds Aren’t Listening, L.A. 
TIMES (Nov. 13, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/13/news/la-ol-marijuana-legalization-
20121112, archived at http://perma.cc/AL8A-3J4T. 
 36. Ron Barnett, More States Look for Ways to Control Gun Laws, USA TODAY (Jan. 11, 2013), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/01/11/in-state-gun-laws/1825943/, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/V542-QD4X; Luige del Puerto, Five Reasons Arizona Is Picking a Fight with the Feds, 
ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES, May 3, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 9632551. 
 37. Editorial, The Washington Legislature Should Legalize Marijuana, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 18, 
2011, available at 2011 WLNR 3562878. 
 38. President Barack Obama, Statement from the White House (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter 
President Obama Statement] (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 
2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration), archived at http://perma.cc/J7XE-LUZ4).  
 39. See, e.g., Rollin M. Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 35, 
35–36 (1939) (collecting cases). 
 40. Id. 
 41. For a helpful overview of the doctrine as customarily taught, see, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, 
Ignorance and Mistake of Criminal Law, Noncriminal Law, and Fact, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 487 493–
496 (2012). 
 42. 507 N.E.2d 1068 (N.Y. 1987).  
 43. Marrero is a main staple of criminal law casebooks. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN 
P. GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 197–205 (6th ed. 2012); PHILLIP E. JOHNSON 
& MORGAN CLOUD, CRIMINAL LAW 79–84 (7th ed. 2002); SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL 
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 304–09 (9th ed. 2012); JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG & GUYORA 
BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2012); CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA HARRIS, 
CRIMINAL LAW 243–49 (2d ed. 2009).  
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officer” exception to the bar against such conduct.44 He had sought advice 
from fellow law enforcement officers and firearms instructors and they 
concurred with his reading of the exemption.
45
 His reading was so 
plausible that the trial court agreed that he fell under the “peace officer” 
exemption and dismissed the indictment.
46
 Even two of the five 
intermediate appellate division judges to consider his appeal agreed with 
his reading.
47
 New York’s highest court affirmed his conviction, however, 
based on a contrary legal interpretation of the statute.
48
 Marrero was not 
caught between two conflicting laws on the books. Rather, he was 
mistaken in his reading of one exceptionally unclear statute.
49
  
Dan Kahan has argued that the court was really condemning Marrero’s 
painstaking search for a loophole to get around the law.
50
 Marrero 
subjected the law to close reading to find a basis for his otherwise 
prohibited conduct.
51
 He was denied a mistake-of-law defense despite his 
reasonable reading of the unclear law because the very nature of his 
exacting search for a loophole showed a moral defect.
52
 Marrero was 
punished for trying to get around the societal norms embedded in the 
law.
53
 
A major distinction when it comes to legalization conflicts is that the 
very existence of the clashing permission and prohibition shows society’s 
morality in conflict. One is not trying to subvert societal morality 
embedded in the criminal law. Rather one agrees with the vision 
embedded in the legalization rather than the criminalization law. When 
society’s legislatures and elected enforcement officials are fractured on 
what normative vision to promulgate, people subject to mixed legal 
messages should not be casualties of the conflict.  
 
 
 44. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.20(a)(1)(c) (McKinney 1987) (exempting “peace officers”); 
N.Y. CRIM. PRO. L. § 1.20(33) (McKinney 1987) (defining “peace officers” as “[a]n attendant, or an 
official, or guard of any state prison or of any penal correctional institution”). 
 45. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d at 1069.  
 46. People v. Marrero, 404 N.Y.S.2d 832, 833 (Sup. Ct. 1978), rev’d, 422 N.Y.S.2d 384 (App. 
Div. 1979). 
 47. People v. Marrero, 422 N.Y.S.2d 384, 388 (App. Div. 1979) (Lynch, J., dissenting, joined by 
Fein, J. P.). 
 48. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d at 1068. 
 49. For critiques, see, e.g., David De Gregorio, Comment, People v. Marrero and Mistake of 
Law, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 231 (1988); Dan M. Kahan, Essay, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse—But 
Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127, 133–137 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan, Ignorance of Law]. 
 50. Kahan, Ignorance of Law, supra note 49, at 150–51. 
 51. Id. at 133. 
 52. Id. at 151. 
 53. Id. 
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So should people faced with the question of which law to follow have a 
defense—at least when enforcers of the criminalization regime acquiesce 
in decriminalization? There are exceptions to the denial of a mistake of 
law defense. Yet like the traditional general rule, the customary exceptions 
were made for a different configuration of a reliance problem. Model 
Penal Code § 2.04(3), adopted in varying forms in many jurisdictions, 
codifies the exception thus: 
 (3) A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is 
a defense to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct 
when: 
 (a) the statute or other enactment defining the offense is not 
known to the actor and has not been published or otherwise 
reasonably made available prior to the conduct alleged; or 
 (b) he acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of 
the law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained 
in (i) a statute or other enactment; (ii) a judicial decision, opinion or 
judgment; (iii) an administrative order or grant of permission; or 
(iv) an official interpretation of the public officer or body charged 
by law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration or 
enforcement of the law defining the offense.
54
 
The difficulty for people hoping to rely on the exception is that it typically 
involves reliance on interpretations of the offense or exceptions to the 
criminalization—not outright conflict between a law clearly authorizing 
the conduct and another law clearly prohibiting it. Under the exception, 
some courts have held that though people are presumed to know the law, 
they are not required to judge the constitutionality of the law or licenses on 
which they rely.
55
 In such cases, however, there was no reason to know of 
the infirmity of the permission on which they relied.
56
 Indeed, courts have 
sometimes explicitly noted that the defendants did not intend to violate 
any penal laws and thus were free from “vice.”57  
Courts have been less charitable where the defendant had good reason 
to know of the illegality of their conduct or the invalidity of the permission 
 
 
 54. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3) (Official Draft 1985). 
 55. E.g., Brent v. State, 43 Ala. 297, 302 (1869); State v. Godwin, 31 S.E. 221, 222 (N.C. 1898). 
 56. Brent, 43 Ala. at 302; Godwin, 31 S.E. at 222. 
 57. E.g., Levy v. Kansas City, 168 F. 524, 528 (8th Cir. 1909) (distinguishing case allowing the 
defendant a mistake-of-law defense based on unconstitutionally granted state license as inapplicable 
because the defendant who was allowed a defense was free of “vice” whereas the petitioner was not). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
918 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:907 
 
 
 
 
on which they claim reliance.
58
 The older cases tend to involve gambling 
businesses.
59
 The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Levy v. Kansas City 
illustrates this point.
60
 Levy involved a conviction under state criminal law, 
which proscribed gambling businesses based on pool-selling and 
bookmaking.
61
 The defendant protested that he had duly purchased a 
license under a Kansas City council ordinance that authorized any person 
to conduct a bookmaking and pool-selling business if he paid an annual 
license fee of $5,000.
62
 The defendant argued that he properly paid his fee 
and should not have to parse whether the local licensing ordinance in 
conflict with controlling state law was preempted.
63
 The Eighth Circuit 
rejected the argument, explaining that the state law prohibiting his activity 
was not new—indeed it was a well-known embodiment of the public 
policy of the state against gambling businesses.
64
  
Despite getting duly licensed and paying his fee to the city, Levy was 
prosecuted and convicted.
65
 The case should send chills down the financial 
spine of marijuana businesses seeking licenses under state law. It also 
stands as a warning to would-be banks or law firms hoping to capitalize on 
the potentially lucrative marijuana start-up business market. The open 
questions facing businesses deciding whether to enter the burgeoning 
marijuana industry involve just one example of the need to clarify when 
people may rely on the law on the books. The next part discusses three 
contemporary areas rife with contemporary decriminalization conflict 
dilemmas.  
B. Three Contemporary Reliance Dilemmas 
Legalization-criminalization conflicts are increasing in complexity 
because of two phenomena: (1) rebellious legalization or criminalization 
in defiance of existing federal law
66
 and (2) partial or complete 
 
 
 58. Id.; People v. Sullivan, 141 P.2d 230, 234–35 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943); State ex rel. 
Dawson v. Anthony Fair Ass’n, 131 P. 626, 628–29 (Kan. 1913). 
 59. E.g., Sullivan, 141 P.2d at 234–35; Anthony Fair Ass’n, 131 P. at 628. 
 60. Levy, 168 F. at 528. 
 61. Id. at 525–26. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. at 528.  
 64. Id.  
 65. Id.  
 66. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 44.99.500 (2012) (declaring Alaskans’ firearms free from federal 
regulation); Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. 
Laws 450 (codified in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. tits. 11, 13, 23, 28, and 41 (2012)) 
(also known as S.B. 1070) (criminalizing failure to carry immigration documents; attempts by 
unlawful aliens to find jobs; transportation of aliens in “reckless[] disregard[]” that the alien is 
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enforcement amnesties despite the formal laws on the books.
67
 Underlying 
the trend are normative and cultural competitions in a pluralistic nation 
sharply split over issues such as drugs, guns, immigration, and 
decriminalization generally.
68
 Criminalization is much easier to achieve 
than decriminalization.
69
 Politicians take a big risk of looking soft on 
crime or soft on illegal aliens in pursuing legalization initiatives.
70
 No 
politician wants to be accused of putting public safety or border security at 
risk.
71
 Criminal laws that are a product of past fears and regulatory 
paradigms linger on the books even as culture and social norms begin to 
change.
72
  
 
 
unlawfully present among other provisions), partially invalidated, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 
2492, 2510 (2012); Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, H.B. 56, 2011 
Ala. Acts 535 §§ 4–5, 12–18, 28 (codified as amended at ALA. CODE § 31-13-1 to § 31-13-30 (2012)) 
(criminalizing failure to carry immigration documents, harboring and transporting aliens while 
“recklessly disregarding” alienage, among other provisions), partially preempted, United States v. 
Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012); Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Governor of Ala., 691 
F.3d 1236, 1244–50 (11th Cir. 2012); Montana Firearms Freedom Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-20-
104 (2009) (declaring Montanans’ firearms free from federal regulation), invalidated by Mont. 
Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975, 982–83 (9th Cir. 2013); Tennessee Firearms Freedom 
Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-54-102 to 4-54-106 (2014) (declaring firearms in Tennessee not subject to 
federal gun laws).  
 67. See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, GUIDANCE: BSA 
EXPECTATIONS REGARDING MARIJUANA-RELATED BUSINESSES 2–6 (Feb. 14, 2014), available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2014-G001.pdf (providing guidance on “how 
financial institutions can provide services to marijuana-related businesses” and declaring criminal 
enforcement priorities); Serge F. Kovaleski, U.S. Issues Marijuana Guidelines for Banks, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 14, 2014, at A10 (reporting on Attorney General Eric Holder’s issuance of guidelines to banks 
“intended to give banks confidence that they will not be punished if they provide services to legitimate 
marijuana businesses in states that have legalized the medical or recreational use of the drug”); Preston 
& Cushman, supra note 1at A1 (reporting on President Obama’s grant of Deferred Action for Early 
Child Arrivals (DACA) program permitting more than 800,000 “young illegal immigrants to come out 
of the shadows, work legally and obtain driver’s licenses and many other documents they have lacked” 
and “remain in the country without fear of deportation”). 
 68. See discussion infra Parts I.B.1–3. 
 69. For a discussion, see, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Essential but Inherently Limited Role of 
the Courts in Prison Reform, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 307, 310 (2008); William J. Stuntz, The 
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 509–12, 529–39 (2001); Michael 
Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Effects of Mandatory Penalties: Two Centuries of Consistent Findings, 
38 CRIME & JUST. 65, 100–03 (2009). 
 70. Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of 
Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 321 (2013); Sara Sun Beale, Essay, The Many Faces of 
Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 
773–75 (2005); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., From “Overcriminalization” to “Smart on Crime”: American 
Criminal Justice Reform—Legacy and Prospects, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 597, 611 (2011). 
 71. For a discussion, see, e.g., Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of 
Penal Law, 90 N.C. L. REV. 581, 626–30 (2012); Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent 
Behavior in Communities of Color: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL 
L. REV. 383, 435–36 (2013). 
 72. For striking examples, see, e.g., Beale, supra note 70, at 750–52. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
920 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:907 
 
 
 
 
Distrust of national legislators to pass a unified solution also creates 
fertile conditions for rebellious state legalization. Anger at the federal 
government—particularly Congress—is at an all-time high.73 Trust is near 
an all-time low.
74
 Bickering and deadlock in Congress led to the second-
longest government shutdown in late 2013 costing the country an 
estimated $2 billion and dampening economic growth.
75
 During the 
shutdown, thirty percent of people surveyed indicated they were angry at 
the government.
76
 An additional fifty-five percent of people surveyed 
indicated they were frustrated at the federal government.
77
 While a 
growing proportion of people distrust the Obama presidential 
administration,
78
 a major focus of frustration is Congress.
79
 Congress has 
increasingly become a place where legislation and ideas go to die.
80
  
In rebellion, states and even the president are sidestepping Congress.
81
 
On some of the most fiercely debated—and stalled—topics in Congress, 
such as drugs, guns, and undocumented immigrants, the states and the 
president are finding alternative routes to realize competing normative 
visions, generating decriminalization conflicts.
82
 Three examples—a main 
 
 
 73. During the federal government shutdown in October 2013, public anger at the federal 
government reached an all-time high since surveys began including the question in 1997. Trust in 
Government Nears Record Low, But Most Federal Agencies Are Viewed Favorably, PEW. RES. (Oct. 
18, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/10/18/trust-in-government-nears-record-low-but-most-
federal-agencies-are-viewed-favorably/, archived at http://perma.cc/A36W-EKRJ. 
 74. Trust in the federal government to “do what is right just about always or most of the time” 
neared the lowest point since surveys began inquiring about government trust in 1958. Id. 
 75. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, IMPACTS AND COSTS OF THE OCTOBER 2013 FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWN 2–8 (2013). 
 76. PEW RES., supra note 73. 
 77. Id.  
 78. E.g., Michael Barone, In Big Government, We Distrust, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Dec. 20, 2013), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/366798/big-government-we-distrust-michael-barone, archived 
at http://perma.cc/D67E-MEN9; Press Release, Quinnipiac University, Obama Job Approval Drops to 
Lowest Point Ever, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; Health Care Act Won’t Improve Health 
Care, Voters Say (Nov. 12, 2013) (available at http://www.quinnipiac.edu/images/polling/us/ 
us11122013_rgf543.pdf); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, For ‘Millennials,’ a Tide of Cynicism and a Partisan 
Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2013, at A11. 
 79. See sources cited supra note 78. See also, e.g., Jeff Zeleny & Megan Thee-Brenan, New Poll 
Finds a Deep Distrust of Government, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2011, at A1 (reporting that 84 percent of 
Americans surveyed disapprove of Congress). 
 80. For commentary and studies regarding gridlock in a polarized Congress and the 
disappearance of moderation, see, e.g., STANLEY B. GREENBERG, THE TWO AMERICAS: OUR CURRENT 
POLITICAL DEADLOCK AND HOW TO BREAK IT 2–5, 26–28 (rev’d ed. 2005); Sarah A. Binder, Going 
Nowhere: A Gridlocked Congress, BROOKINGS REV., Jan. 2000, at 16–18; Richard Fleisher & John R. 
Bond, The Shrinking Middle in the US Congress, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 429, 429–45 (2004); 
Symposium, The American Congress: Legal Implications of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065, 
2065–2120 (2013). 
 81. See discussion of examples infra Part I.B.1–3. 
 82. Id. 
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example and two secondary ones for contrast—are discussed below to 
show how these intergovernmental clashes pose unanswered questions and 
risks for people and businesses subject to the competing legal regimes. 
Two examples arise from state rebellions over federal criminalization 
rousing markedly different federal responses. The third example stems 
from a presidential uprising over congressional inaction over immigration 
reform legislation.  
1. The Perilous Boom Industry of Marijuana Legalization 
From its earliest days, marijuana regulation involved culture clashes 
over race and health and safety impact.
83
 Today, the culture clashes have 
led to legal conflicts that pose open questions for people and businesses 
wondering whether they may rely on state laws licensing marijuana 
production and retail despite federal criminalization. 
a. Culture Clash 
Since 1937, the federal government has regulated marijuana, also 
referred to as cannabis.
84
 Anti-cannabis campaigning arose during the 
Great Depression, fueled by popular associations of marijuana smoking 
with Mexican workers and rising anti-immigrant sentiment in Western 
states.
85
 Initially, federal authorities responded to the states’ urging for 
marijuana regulation by recommending that the states adopt uniform state 
narcotics regulations.
86
 Frustrated with the slow federal response, 
California became the first state to outlaw marijuana in 1915.
87
 The early 
anti-marijuana law was then used to target Mexicans, just as earlier anti-
opium legislation in the state had been used against the Chinese.
88
 
The battle over the claimed medicinal benefits of marijuana and its 
health and safety risks familiar today also raged during the 1930s.
89
 
Campaigners argued that marijuana posed risks of insanity, suicide, and 
 
 
 83. See sources and discussion infra at notes 85–92. 
 84. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551 (repealed 1970). 
 85. DRUGS IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 189–90 (David F. Musto ed., 2002). 
 86. Id. at 190. 
 87. MARTIN A. LEE, SMOKE SIGNALS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF MARIJUANA—MEDICAL, 
RECREATIONAL, AND SCIENTIFIC 42 (2012). 
 88. Id.  
 89. LESTER GRINSPOON & JAMES B. BAKALAR, MARIHUANA: THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE 8–12 
(1993); DRUGS IN AMERICA, supra note 85, at 189–90. 
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addiction.
90
 Many also argued that marijuana “incited criminal 
behavior”—including larceny, assault, rape, robbery and murder.91 Yet 
doctors also prescribed marijuana to treat medical issues such as migraine 
attacks, insomnia, and pain from menstruation, childbirth, or rheumatoid 
arthritis.
92
  
Federal authorities became more confident in their ability to regulate 
marijuana in 1937 after the Supreme Court upheld the National Firearms 
Act, which regulated machine guns by imposing a tax on their transfer.
93
 
The same year, legislators passed the Marihuana Tax Act, which 
effectively curbed the marijuana trade through a combination of 
prohibitively high transfer taxes, burdensome regulations for doctors 
prescribing marijuana, and severe federal penalties for noncompliance.
94
  
Portions of the Marihuana Tax Act were struck down by the Supreme 
Court in 1969, in Leary v. United States.
95
 Leary involved a doctor 
indicted for smuggling marijuana from Mexico into the United States and 
for failing to pay the transfer tax.
96
 He successfully argued that compliance 
with the Marihuana Tax Act violated his privilege against self-
incrimination because the act compelled him to file a form self-reporting 
that he violated the law.
97
 The Court concluded that the statute perversely 
“on its face permitted him to acquire the drug legally, provided he paid the 
$100 per ounce transfer tax and gave incriminating information, and 
simultaneously with a system of regulations . . . prohibited him from 
acquiring marihuana under any conditions.”98 
The invalidation of indirect regulation through burdensome 
administrative and tax requirements came at a turning point for narcotics 
criminalization. In 1969, amid a national sense of urgency over rising drug 
use, crime, and social unrest, President Richard Nixon declared a “war on 
drugs.”99 Marijuana became one of many drugs directly criminalized under 
 
 
 90. Walter Bromberg, Marihuana: A Psychiatric Study, in DRUGS IN AMERICA, supra note 85, 
441, 443. 
 91. Id. at 441–442; OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, WHAT AMERICANS NEED TO 
KNOW ABOUT MARIJUANA 5 (2011). 
 92. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 89, at 4–8. 
 93. Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 511–14 (1937). 
 94. For a concise history see, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 11 (2005); H.R. REP. NO. 75-
792, at 1–3 (1937); S. REP. NO. 75-900, at 2–3 (1937). 
 95. 395 U.S. 6 (1969). 
 96. Id. at 10–11. 
 97. Id. at 16–26. 
 98. Id. at 26. 
 99. For histories, see, e.g., DAVID F. MUSTO & PAMELA KORSMEYER, THE QUEST FOR DRUG 
CONTROL: POLITICS AND FEDERAL POLICY IN A PERIOD OF INCREASING SUBSTANCE ABUSE, 1963–
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the federal Controlled Substances Act, which was enacted as Title II of the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.
100
  
The Controlled Substances Act, which is the main form of federal 
criminalization today, classifies illicit drugs into five categories based on 
medicinal uses and health and safety risks.
101
 Marijuana is listed among 
Schedule I controlled substances, which are deemed to have a high risk of 
adverse effects and lack of accepted medicinal use.
102
 Classification as a 
Schedule I controlled substance means marijuana manufacturing, 
distribution, or possession are criminal offenses and there is no federal 
medical marijuana exception.
103
  
Designation of marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance without 
recognized medical uses is highly controversial.
104
 In 2010, the American 
Medical Association (AMA) adopted a resolution supporting rescheduling 
marijuana out of Schedule I to facilitate research and development of 
cannabis-based treatments.
105
 While believing cannabis to be a dangerous 
drug and a public health concern, the AMA concluded that federal drug 
policies over the past 40 years have been ineffective and it argued for 
“public health based strategies, rather than incarceration” to deal with 
cannabis use.
106
 
Marijuana criminalization also is intensely controversial because of the 
disparate impact of prosecution.
107
 There has been a wide and growing 
 
 
1981, at 60 (2002); Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 785 
n.1 (2004). 
 100. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 812–844 
(2012)). 
 101. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012). 
 102. Id. § 812(b), (c). 
 103. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012) (criminalizing conduct); id. at § 844(a) (penalties for 
possession); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 490–91 (2001) 
(discussing the lack of medical exception for marijuana).  
 104. See, e.g., Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 15 F.3d 1131, 1133–36 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (discussing and rejecting petition to reschedule marijuana); Letter from Rep. Earl Blumenauer, 
D-Ore., to President Barack Obama (Feb. 14, 2014), quoted in Kovaleski, supra note 67, at A10 (letter 
on behalf of 18 members of Congress) (“Classifying marijuana as Schedule 1 [sic] at the federal level 
perpetuates an unjust and irrational system. . . . Schedule 1 recognizes no medical use, disregarding 
both medical evidence and the laws of nearly half of the states that have legalized medical 
marijuana.”); Eric A. Voth, A Peek into Pandora’s Box: The Medical Excuse Marijuana Controversy, 
22 J. ADDICTIVE DISEASES 27, 28–30 (2004) (giving history of attempts to reschedule marijuana). 
 105. AM. MED. ASS’N, REPORT 3 OF THE COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND PUBLIC HEALTH (I-09), USE 
OF CANNABIS FOR MEDICINAL PURPOSES (2010) (Resolutions 910, I-08; 921, I-08; and 229, A-09); 
Diane E. Hoffman & Ellen Weber, Medical Marijuana and the Law, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1453, 
1453–55 (2010). 
 106. AM. MED. ASS’N, REPORT 2 OF THE COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND PUBLIC HEALTH (I-13): A 
CONTEMPORARY VIEW OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY (2013) (Resolutions 520-A-11, 511-A-
12, 512-A-13) [hereinafter AMA REPORT 2]. 
 107. See, e.g., ACLU, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE 17–22 (2013); Andrew 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
924 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:907 
 
 
 
 
disparity in the arrest rates of blacks compared to whites for marijuana 
possession in 38 out of 50 states.
108
 Blacks are 2.5 times more likely to be 
arrested for marijuana possession than whites, though survey data 
indicates similar prevalence of usage between whites and blacks.
109
 The 
disproportionate concentration of blacks in socioeconomically 
disadvantaged communities with familial breakdown due to poverty and 
high incarceration rates aggravates the disproportionality in arrests.
110
  
Despite criminalization, marijuana is the most widely used illegal drug 
in the nation
111
 and in the world today.
112
 In a Gallup poll, thirty-eight 
percent of Americans admitted to having tried marijuana.
113
 Among young 
adults surveyed in 2010, the estimated lifetime prevalence of marijuana 
use in 2010 was 25.4 percent.
114
 Views on marijuana are also changing, 
with increasing numbers of Americans supporting legalization.
115
 In 2013, 
for the first time since Gallup began surveying Americans about marijuana 
legalization in 1969, a bare majority of Americans—fifty-eight percent—
supported legalization.
116
 
Counterbalanced against shifting cultural attitudes are concerns over 
the health and safety risks of readily available marijuana. Some of the 
risks identified by researchers include cognitive impairments that worsen 
with heavy long-term use or juvenile use when the brain is still 
developing;
117
 earlier onset and worsening of psychoses such as 
 
 
Golub et al., The Race/Ethnicity Disparity in Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 6 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 131, 132–55 (2007); Michael Tonry, Racial Politics, Racial Disparities, 
and the War on Crime, 40 CRIME & DELINQ. 475, 479–88 (1994). 
 108. ACLU, supra note 107, at 20–21. 
 109. Rajeev Ramchand et al., Racial Differences in Marijuana-Users’ Risk of Arrest in the United 
States, 84 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 264, 264–70 (2006). 
 110. David S. Kirk, The Neighborhood Context of Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Arrest, 45 
DEMOGRAPHY 55, 62–70 (2008). 
 111. OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, supra note 91, at 1; SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND 
MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, RESULTS FROM THE 2013 NATIONAL 
SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL FINDINGS (2014). 
 112. Wayne Hall & Louisa Degenhardt, Prevalence and Correlates of Cannabis Use in Developed 
and Developing Countries, 20 CURRENT OP. IN PSYCHIATRY 393, 393–95 (2007); T. Leggett, A 
Review of the World Cannabis Situation, 58 BULL. ON NARCOTICS 1, 1 (2006). 
 113. Lydia Saad, In U.S., 38% Have Tried Marijuana, Little Changed Since ‘80s, GALLUP (Aug. 
2, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/163835/tried-marijuana-little-changed-80s.aspx. 
 114. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, supra note 111, at 
11–4658, tbl.8.1. 
 115. Art Swift, For First Time, Americans Favor Legalizing Marijuana, GALLUP (Oct. 22, 2013), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/165539/first-time-americans-favor-legalizing-marijuana.aspx. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Rebecca D. Crean et al., An Evidence Based Review of Acute and Long-Term Effects of 
Cannabis Use on Executive Cognitive Functions, 5 J. ADDICTION MED. 1, 4–6 (2011); Miriam 
Schneider, Puberty as a Highly Vulnerable Developmental Period for the Consequences of Cannabis 
Exposure, 13 ADDICTION BIOLOGY 253, 253–61 (2008); Nadia Solowij et al., Cognitive Functioning 
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schizophrenia;
118
 intoxicated driving;
119
 addiction;
120
 and poor educational 
outcomes among young marijuana users.
121
 It is therefore unsurprising that 
Americans are split. While a growing contingent supports 
decriminalization, another strong cohort remains concerned that 
legalization will legitimize marijuana use and have adverse health and 
safety impacts.
122
 
b. Decriminalization Conflict 
The fracturing of societal consensus over marijuana criminalization is 
manifesting in an increasing fragmentation of state laws legalizing aspects 
of marijuana use, cultivation, and retail. Once upon a time, not long ago, 
state law generally dutifully mirrored federal law in controlled substances 
regulation. All fifty states adopted variations of the Uniform Controlled 
Substances Act, modeled on the federal Controlled Substances Act.
123
 The 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act provides for similar state designation 
and regulation of federal controlled substances unless an appropriately 
designated state agency objected.
124
 Today, twenty-one states and the 
District of Columbia have legalized marijuana for medical purposes.
125
 By 
popular vote, four states—Washington, Colorado, Oregon, and Alaska—
 
 
of Long-Term Heavy Cannabis Users Seeking Treatment, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1123, 1129–30 
(2002). 
 118. Cecile Henquet et al., The Environment and Schizophrenia: The Role of Cannabis Use, 31 
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 608, 608–10 (2005); E. Manrique-Garcia et al., Cannabis, Schizophrenia and 
Other Non-Affective Psychoses: 35 Years of Follow-up of a Population-Based Cohort, 42 PSYCHOL. 
MED. 1321, 1321–22, 1325–26 (2012).  
 119. Ralph Hingson et al., Teenage Driving After Using Marijuana or Drinking and Traffic 
Accident Involvement, 13 J. SAFETY RES. 33, 33–37 (1982); Isabelle Richer & Jacques Bergeron, 
Driving Under the Influence of Cannabis: Links with Dangerous Driving, Psychological Predictors, 
and Accident Involvement, 41 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 299, 304–05 (2009).  
 120. Alan J. Budney & Brent A. Moore, Development and Consequences of Cannabis 
Dependence, 42 J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 28S, 30S-31S (2002). 
 121. Michael Lynskey & Wayne Hall, The Effects of Adolescent Cannabis Use on Educational 
Attainment: A Review, 95 ADDICTION 1621, 1622–28 (2000). 
 122. See, e.g., Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 
No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681–758 (“Efforts to legalize or otherwise legitimize drug use present a 
message to the youth of the United States that drug use is acceptable.”); AMA REPORT 2, supra note 
106 (opposing marijuana legalization though deploring the failure of federal drug policy). 
 123. See, e.g., Seeley v. Washington, 940 P.2d 604, 611 (Wash. 1997) (en banc) (giving history). 
 124. UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT § 201(a) (1994). 
 125. For a map of state laws, see State Marijuana Laws Map, GOVERNING (2013), 
http://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-recreational.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/GM39-YVRA (last visited Oct. 27, 2014). The jurisdictions include Alaska, Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, Washington, and Washington DC. Id. 
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have garnered national attention by taking the lead in legalizing, licensing, 
and taxing marijuana production and retail for recreational use.
126
 The 
District of Columbia also legalized recreational marijuana possession and 
personal-use cultivation but Congress soon exercised its special authority 
over the District to block the measure.
127
 
Marijuana law is an expanding legal field rife with questions. 
Marijuana has become a flourishing business in legalization states, with 
entrepreneurs searching for ways to store bricks of cash and law firms 
seeking to develop potentially lucrative marijuana law expertise.
128
 For 
banks and law firms, however, a major stumbling block is the risk of being 
accused of aiding and abetting a federal crime.
129
 Banks and law firms 
tend to be highly conservative institutions when it comes to legal 
compliance because certain forms of law breaking can mean a business 
death penalty—suspension of the license to operate or practice.130 Even 
short of the most severe imaginable penalty, banks and firms may be 
concerned with financial and reputational censure from the perception of 
aiding and abetting federal lawbreakers that may injure their business 
standing.
131
 
Both banks and lawyers operate under heightened duties. Anti-money 
laundering law makes it a crime for banks to conduct financial transactions 
with the proceeds of illegal activity, such as dealing in a controlled 
 
 
 126. Alaska Measure 2, An Act to Tax and Regulate the Production, Sale, and Use of Marijuana 
(passed Nov. 4, 2014), codified at ALASKA STAT. 17.38.010–900; Colo. Amend. 64 (passed Nov. 6, 
2012), codified at COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16; Ore. Measure 91, Control, Regulation, and Taxation 
of Marijuana and Industrial Hemp Act (passed Nov. 4, 2014), codified in scattered sections at OR. 
REV. STAT. §§ 317.005–991, 475.005–295, 811.005–812; Wash. Initiative 502, (passed Nov. 6, 2012), 
codified in scattered sections at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.50.101, 69.50.401, 69.50.4013, 69.50.412, 
69.50.4121, 69.50.500, 46.20.308, 46.61.502, 46.61.504, 46.61.50571, 46.61.506. 
 127. DC Initiative 71, Legalization of Possession of Minimal Amounts of Marijuana for Personal 
Use Act of 2014 (passed Nov. 4, 2014); Aaron C. Davis & Ed O’Keefe, Congressional Spending Deal 
Blocks Pot Legalization in D.C., WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/local/dc-politics/congressional-budget-deal-may-upend-marijuana-legalization-in-dc/2014/12/09/ 
6dff94f6-7f2e-11e4-8882-03cf08410beb_story.html. 
 128. See, e.g., Kovaleski, supra note 6, at A1 (describing marijuana entrepreneurs with large 
bricks of cash worrying about where to start such large quantities); Valerie Bauman, A Legal High: 
Practicing Marijuana Business Law, PUGET SOUND BUS. J. (Aug. 22, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://www.biz 
journals.com/seattle/news/2013/08/23/a-legal-high-practicing-marijuana.html?page=all, archived at 
http://perma.cc/JW4L-BK8E (describing a law firm’s early entry into the market and “profitab[ility] 
almost instantly”). 
 129. See, e.g., Southall, supra note 1, at A1 (discussing dilemmas). 
 130. See, e.g., John A. Kelley et al., International Banking and Finance, 34 INT’L LAWYER 429, 
430 (2000) (discussing the business “death penalty” of suspension of a bank charter). 
 131. Cf. Richard R. Cheatham & James W. Stevens, Absent Regulatory Changes, Hispanic 
Immigrants Pose an Unbankable Risk, 123 BANKING L.J. 195, 195–96 (2006) (discussing chilling 
effects of fear of reputational and financial censure that make banks reluctant to work with the 
Hispanic immigrant community).  
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substance.
132
 Under the Bank Secrecy Law, banks also are required to file 
reports of suspicious activity by their customers.
133
 Ethically, attorneys 
may not advise people or businesses about how to break the law or escape 
liability for law breaking.
134
 Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d) 
states: “A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in 
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.”135 Thus, would-
be marijuana lawyers are walking an ethical tightrope when clients seek 
help with everyday business matters such as setting up a business and 
dealing with employment and other operational matters. Facilitating 
marijuana businesses by drafting business documents, for example, would 
appear to aid in the distribution of marijuana in violation of federal 
criminal law.
136
  
Some state bar associations have issued ethical opinions to try to help 
their lawyers navigate the complicated terrain—and fractured on what 
position to take.
137
 After Maine legalized medical marijuana, its state bar 
ethics commission issued an opinion in 2010 advising that attorneys may 
not assist clients in violating federal law—whether the federal law is 
enforced or not and notwithstanding the state legalization.
138
 An informal 
ethics opinion issued in Connecticut after the passage of medical 
marijuana legalization took a similar approach.
139
 In contrast, after 
 
 
 132. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 195657 (2012). See also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1956(c)(7)(A) (2012) (including offenses listed at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 among covered offenses); 18 
U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (2012) (including dealing in a controlled substance). 
 133. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (2012). 
 134. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preamble [9] (2013) (discussing a lawyer’s 
dual responsibility “to the legal system” and “the lawyer’s obligation zealously to protect and pursue a 
client’s legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law”); Harold Hongju Koh, A World Without 
Torture, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 641, 654 (2005) (“[I]f a client asks a lawyer how to break the 
law and escape liability, a good lawyer should not say, ‘Here’s how.’ The lawyer’s ethical duty is to 
say no.”). 
 135. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2013). 
 136. Cf., e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally 
Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 669, 683 (1981) (interpreting Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility to prohibit facilitative criminal conduct “by giving advice that encourages the client to 
pursue the conduct or indicates how to reduce the risks of detection, or by performing an act that 
substantially furthers the course of conduct”). 
 137. E.g., State Bar of Ariz., Ethics Op. 11-01 (Feb. 2011), http://www.azbar.org/Ethics/ 
EthicsOpinions/ViewEthicsOpinion?id=710, archived at http://perma.cc/P7CB-ERDG (allowing 
lawyers to assist); Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Me. State Bar, Op. 199 (July 7, 2010), http://www. 
mebaroverseers.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?id=110134, archived at http://perma.cc/UN4P-
FHJN [hereinafter Prof’l Ethics Comm’n of Me.]. 
 138. Prof’l Ethics Comm’n of Me., supra note 137. 
 139. Conn. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Informal Op. 2013-02, Providing Legal Services to 
Clients Seeking Licenses Under the Connecticut Medical Marijuana Law (Jan. 16, 2013), 
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.ctbar.org/resource/resmgr/Ethics_Opinions/Informal_Opinion_2013-
02.pdf. 
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Arizona legalized medical marijuana, the state bar association in 2011 
issued an ethics opinion permitting lawyers to assist clients whose conduct 
is in “‘clear and unambiguous compliance with state law” so long as the 
clients are advised of the risks under federal law.
140
 After Colorado 
legalized recreational marijuana in 2012, its Supreme Court amended its 
version of Rule 1.2 along the lines of Arizona’s approach.141 In 
Washington state—which also legalized recreational marijuana—the 
bench and bar are engaged in vigorous debate about whether and how to 
amend its ethical rules.
142
 Thus, while the marijuana law boom fields may 
be exciting terrain for firms and banks to expand, the domain also is 
perilously uncertain. 
While marijuana entrepreneurs and users may be less risk-averse than 
bankers and lawyers, the risk of federal prosecution is also a concern for 
them.
143
 From the early days of medical marijuana legalization, beginning 
with California’s Compassionate Use Act of 1996,144 to today, users, 
growers, and retailers risk federal prosecution.
145
 The Supreme Court in 
 
 
 140. State Bar of Ariz., supra note 137 (quoting DOJ Memorandum). 
 141. After the 2014 revision to the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct, a comment to Rule 
1.2 now states: 
A lawyer may counsel a client regarding the validity, scope, and meaning of Colorado 
constitution article XVIII, secs. 14 & 16, and may assist a client in conduct that the lawyer 
reasonably believes is permitted by these constitutional provisions and the statutes, 
regulations, orders, and other state or local provisions implementing them. In these 
circumstances, the lawyer shall also advise the client regarding related federal law and 
policy.  
COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 14 (added Mar. 24, 2014), available at 
http://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/22126, archived at http://perma.cc/9NK7-78V2. 
 142. See, e.g., Letter from Anne M. Daly, President, King Cnty. Bar Ass’n, to the Honorable 
Barbara Madsen, Chief Justice & the Honorable Charles Johnson, Wash. State Supreme Court (Oct. 4, 
2013) (on file with author) (proposing rule changes); King Cnty. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Advisory Op. on I-
502 & Rules of Prof’l Conduct (Oct. 16, 2013) (on file with author) (advising bar members while 
waiting on decision on request to amend the rules); Letter from Douglas J. Ende, Chief Disciplinary 
Counsel, to Assoc. Chief Justice Charles W. Johnson, Chair, Wash. Supreme Court Rules Comm’n 
(Oct. 24, 2013) (on file with author) (opposing proposed rule changes). 
 143. See, e.g., Sunil Kumar Aggarwal et al., Distress, Coping and Drug Law Enforcement in a 
Series of Patients Using Medical Cannabis, 45 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 292, 292–300 (2013) 
(discussing survey findings of distress over the risk of law enforcement surveillance and prosecution 
among medical marijuana patients); Erik Eckholm, Medical Marijuana Industry Is Unnerved by U.S. 
Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2011, at A22 (detailing concerns of billion-dollar medical 
marijuana industry over federal crackdowns on growers and sellers). 
 144. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2007). 
 145. See, e.g., Kristina Davis, Feds Expand Medical Pot Crackdown to Delivery Services, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2013/feb/27/tp-feds-expand-
medical-pot-crackdown-to-delivery/, archived at http://perma.cc/BT6-VCBD (discussing federal raids 
on medical marijuana storefront and mobile delivery services); Oren Dorell, Trapped Between State 
and Nation: Conflicting Laws Can Spell Trouble for Patients Using Medical Marijuana, USA TODAY, 
Nov. 9, 2010, at 3A (detailing medical marijuana patient concerns). 
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Gonzales v. Raich affirmed the power of the federal government to enact 
the Controlled Substances Act under its power to regulate commerce, 
rejecting a challenge by Californian medical marijuana users and 
growers.
146
 Medical marijuana users and growers have been raided and 
prosecuted—including cancer and HIV patients using marijuana to treat 
severe pain.
147
 In the past, some defendants were barred from even 
mentioning medical marijuana legalization in their defense, leading them 
to accept guilty pleas.
148
  
Two important changes are giving reliance claims more force. First, 
states are no longer deciding just to refrain from criminalizing 
marijuana.
149
 Among medical marijuana legalization states, the main 
paradigm was simply state inaction—carving out exceptions to state 
criminalization.
150
 The emerging approach is for states to affirmatively 
license marijuana production and retail facilities.
151
 The affirmative state 
imprimatur through the grant of licenses changes the nature of the 
argument. The fact that states decline to precisely mirror federal marijuana 
criminalization is not a grant of permission. In contrast, licensing and 
registration schemes complete with potentially hefty taxes look more like 
affirmative permission.  
Second, rather than aggressively opposing the affirmative licensing 
schemes, federal enforcement officials have begun to declare acquiescence 
and even cautious encouragement. An early and heavily caveated move in 
the direction of acquiescence was an October 19, 2009 memorandum by 
 
 
 146. 545 U.S. 1, 17–32 (2005). 
 147. See, e.g., Los Angeles Drug Case Bars Medical Marijuana Defense, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 
1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/07/us/los-angeles-drug-case-bars-medical-marijuana-defense. 
html (discussing prosecution of people using marijuana for pain from cancer and HIV). 
 148. Id. (discussing preclusion of the defense in prosecution of defendants Todd McCormick and 
Peter McWilliams). See also, e.g., United States v. McCormick, 52 F. App’x 75, 76 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(unreported) (relating subsequent guilty pleas). 
 149. Compare, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(d) (West 2007) (stating that state 
marijuana criminalization does not extend to a patient with a valid prescription), with COLO. CONST. 
art. XVIII, § 16(5) (providing for state licensing of marijuana retail establishments); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 69.50.325 (2014) (providing for the issuance of marijuana producers and retailers licenses). 
 150. For a discussion of the distinction between action in conflict with federal criminalization and 
state inaction, see, e.g., Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the 
States’ Overlooked Power To Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1423–424, 1428–32 
(2009).  
 151. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(5); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.325 (2014). See also, e.g., Ed 
Stannard, Connecticut’s Medical Marijuana Prices to Be Set by ‘Competitive Market’, NEW HAVEN 
REG. (Feb. 2, 2014, 5:39 PM), http://www.nhregister.com/general-news/20140202/connecticuts-
medical-marijuana-prices-to-be-set-by-competitive-market, archived at http://perma.cc/W2SK-VU67 
(noting that only five states, including Connecticut, require state-regulated cultivation and 
dispensaries). 
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Deputy Attorney General David Ogden.
152
 Ogden wrote that federal 
prosecutors should focus on “significant traffickers” of illegal drugs and 
trafficking networks and that “pursuit of these priorities should not focus 
federal resources in your States on individuals whose actions are in clear 
and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for the 
medical use of marijuana.”153 Therefore, prosecution of “individuals with 
cancer or other serious illnesses” and their caregivers should not be a 
priority.
154
 But “prosecution of commercial enterprises that unlawfully 
market and sell marijuana for profit” continues to be an enforcement 
priority.
155
 The enforcement memorandum thus sent a signal of partial 
acquiescence in state legalization regimes insofar as they exempted 
medical marijuana users—but not insofar as they exempted dispensaries 
from prosecution. 
After the passage of landmark state laws affirmatively licensing and 
taxing recreational marijuana distributors, the decision whether to 
intervene or acquiesce was even more starkly presented. Because of the 
state action—rather than mere inaction—in licensing marijuana growers 
and retailers, federal authorities had a stronger case of preemption by the 
Controlled Substances Act.
156
 Indeed, the Obama Administration 
previously had reacted vigorously and successfully in challenging state 
immigration regulation conflicting with the federal enforcement scheme, 
obtaining partial injunctions against the state laws.
157
  
Rather than similarly seeking injunctions, however, federal authorities 
signaled stronger acquiescence—and even tacit encouragement—to state 
marijuana decriminalization.
158
 In a memorandum to all U.S. Attorneys, 
Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole signaled that the Justice 
Department would entrust the marijuana legalization states to “implement 
strong and effective regulatory and enforcement systems that will address 
the threat those state laws could pose to public safety, public health, and 
 
 
 152. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Selected U.S. Attorneys 
(Oct. 19, 2009), available at http://blogs.justice.gov/main/archives/192, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
36GK-TSZS. 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2505 (2012) (invalidating state 
immigration regulation regime that conflicted with the enforcement mechanism under federal law). Cf. 
Mikos, supra note 150, at 1423–24 (distinguishing state inaction). 
 157. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. at 2510; United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 
1269 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Alabama, 443 F. App’x 411 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 158. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., to All U.S. Attorneys (Aug. 29, 
2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf 
[hereinafter 2013 Cole Memorandum].  
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other law enforcement interests.”159 If states did so, the Cole memorandum 
indicated that “enforcement of state law by state and local law 
enforcement and regulatory bodies” would “remain the primary means of 
addressing marijuana-related activity.”160 To accommodate state-
sanctioned grow and retail operations, the Cole Memorandum rescinded 
the distinction between users and commercial marijuana operations.
161
 
President Obama followed the memorandum by telling the nation that 
the legalization schemes should “go forward because it’s important for 
society not to have a situation in which a large portion of people have at 
one time or another broken the law and only a select few get punished.” 162 
The president expressed concern that the enforcement of marijuana 
criminalization laws disproportionately impacts the socioeconomically 
disadvantaged, particularly African-American and Latino youths.
163
 He 
said the federal government would not stand in the way of state reforms in 
how to address marijuana use and had better things to do than go after 
recreational pot users.
164
 To further facilitate state experimentation in 
changing the marijuana criminalization paradigm, the Obama 
administration issued guidance to reassure banks reluctant to work with 
marijuana businesses.
165
  
The flurry of memoranda have made the current presidential 
administration the most friendly in history toward state marijuana 
legalization initiatives. Yet this receptive stance has not removed doubts 
and concerns over prosecution.
166
 Indeed, even memoranda designed to 
remove some of the chill of doubt all bear versions of a standard 
disclaimer to the effect that the enforcement guidance “does not ‘legalize’ 
marijuana or provide a legal defense to a violation of federal law, nor is it 
 
 
 159. Id. at 2.  
 160. Id. at 3.  
 161. Id. 
 162. David Remnic, Going the Distance, NEW YORKER, Jan. 27, 2014, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2014/01/27/140127fa_fact_remnick, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
TW4R-4ZYT. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Dennis, supra note 4. 
 165. Dep’t of the Treasury supra note 67 (providing guidance on “how financial institutions can 
provide services to marijuana-related businesses” and declaring criminal enforcement priorities); 
Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., to All U.S. Attorneys (Feb. 14, 2014), 
available at http://www.dfi.wa.gov/banks/pdf/dept-of-justice-memo.pdf; Danielle Douglas, Obama 
Administration Clears Banks to Accept Funds from Legal Marijuana Dealers, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/obama-administration-clears-banks-to-accept-
funds-from-legal-marijuana-dealers/2014/02/14/55127b04-9599-11e3-9616-d367fa6ea99b_story.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/VUX5-QVTH. 
 166. See, e.g., Kovaleski, supra note 6, at A1 (reporting on banks’ concerns over prosecution for 
aiding and abetting a criminal enterprise). 
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intended to create any privileges, benefits, or rights, substantive or 
procedural, enforceable by any individual, party [sic] or witness in any 
administrative, civil, or criminal matter.”167 In currently pending 
prosecutions, courts are confronting attempts by marijuana business 
defendants to argue reliance on state legalization and federal receptivity 
toward legalization.
168
 Guidance is needed.  
2. State Firearms Nullification Laws  
Firearms regulation is another area rife with culture wars over 
regulation and a flowering of rebellious state legislation.
169
 The federal 
response to such state firearms regulation offers an informative contrast to 
the acquiescence and even receptivity toward marijuana regulation. 
The rugged American romance with the right to bear arms is so strong 
that the right is enshrined in the U.S. Constitution.
170
 Whether the Second 
Amendment was meant to preserve an individual’s right to bear arms or 
whether the right is tied to militia service is heavily debated.
171
 Though 
vigorously divided on the issue, the Supreme Court ruled in District of 
Columbia v. Heller that the right to bear arms is an individual one and 
handgun ownership may not be wholly banned.
172
 But the right to bear 
arms is not absolute. Some regulation is permissible in the interest of 
preventing firearms violence.
173
 Attempts at firearms restrictions, 
however, face fierce backlash as the nation witnessed most recently during 
 
 
 167. Ogden, supra note 152. 
 168. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1084 (D. Mont. 2012) (noting 
that the defendant and many others “began cultivating and selling medical marijuana under the 
assumption that they could become legitimate providers under state law and not be selectively arrested 
and prosecuted under federal law” and the “choice has now proven very costly for these providers” 
whose businesses have been raided). 
 169. For a discussion of the conflict over gun regulation from a cultural cognition perspective see 
Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 134–36 (2007). 
 170. U.S. CONST. amend II.  
 171. E.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581, 636 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting, 
joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a 
Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1162–64 (1991); Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second 
Amendment Scholarship: A Primer, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 5–8 (2000); Adam Winkler, Heller’s 
Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1573–74 (2009). Cf. Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE 
L.J. 82, 86 n.15 (2013) (describing the question of whether the Second Amendment protects an 
individual right to gun ownership unconnected to militia purposes as “long the central battle in Second 
Amendment law and scholarship”).  
 172. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (majority opinion). See also, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 
U.S. 742 (2010) (applying the interpretation to states and localities). Cf. Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as 
Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1321 (2009) 
(critiquing the majority’s historical account as “more romance than real”). 
 173. Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/6
  
 
 
 
 
2015] LEGALIZATION DEFENSES 933 
 
 
 
 
firearms regulation reform efforts after the Sandy Hook school 
shootings.
174
 
The freedom to bear arms has a particular mystique for regions and 
groups with a strong, rugged, and individualist culture.
175
 Opponents of 
gun control tend to prize individual self-sufficiency and generally oppose 
governmental control—especially centralized governmental control.176 
Attempts at federal firearms legislation therefore rouse particular ire.
177
 
Federal firearms legislation has been hard-won.
178
 The most recently 
enacted major federal firearms legislation that still remains on the books 
today are the 1993 Brady Bill, which provides for background checks on 
gun purchasers,
179
 and the 1996 Lautenberg Amendment, which prohibits 
domestic abusers convicted of misdemeanors from possessing firearms.
180
  
Especially when it comes to firearms regulation, federal action has 
sparked powerful reactions. For example, the backlash against the Brady 
Bill led to an intense and successful campaign to punish legislators who 
voted in favor, shifting the balance of power between the parties in 
Congress.
181
 In recent decades, because of the sharp cultural cleavages 
over whether and how to limit firearms availability, individual states have 
taken the lead in experimenting with firearms restrictions.
182
 Creating 
sufficient cultural consensus for legislation is more attainable at the 
regional level than at the fractured national level. Of course, such cultural 
 
 
 174. See, e.g., Jack Healy, Colorado Lawmakers Ousted in Recall Vote over Gun Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2013, at A1 (reporting on successful ouster of legislators who passed gun control 
laws); Philip Rucker & Sari Horwitz, On Gun Control, Obama’s Record Shows an Apparent Lack of 
Political Will—Until Now, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/on-
gun-control-obamas-record-shows-an-apparent-lack-of-political-will--until-now/2012/12/23/913a362 
6-4937-11e2-ad54-580638ede391_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5BVM-8C3A (discussing 
how the massacre of twenty schoolchildren in Newtown by a shooter who then committed suicide 
spurred President Obama to advocate for firearms regulation reform). 
 175. Dan M. Kahan, The Gun Control Debate: A Culture-Theory Manifesto, 60 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 3, 4 (2003). 
 176. See id. at 6. 
 177. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 227 (2008) (detailing fury after passage of the Brady Bill and the punishment 
of legislators who voted in favor). 
 178. Id.; Philip J. Cook, The Great American Gun War: Notes from Four Decades in the 
Trenches, 42 CRIME & JUST. 19, 26–27 (2013). 
 179. Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–22 (2012)). The assault weapons ban of 1994 was allowed 
to sunset. 
 180. Pub. L. 104-208, §658, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-371 to 3009-372 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–
22, 925 (2012)). 
 181. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 177, at 227 (detailing fury after passage of the Brady Bill and the 
punishment of legislators who voted in favor). 
 182. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1124–28 (2014); 
Cook, supra note 178, at 27. 
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views at the state level are not just limited to regulating guns and 
ratcheting up standards from the federal baseline. States are also 
challenging federal firearms regulations through competing state laws.  
The state legal rebellion was sparked by fear of more firearms 
regulation and taxes after President Barack Obama was inaugurated in 
January 2009.
183
 Since then, at least nine states have enacted laws aimed at 
nullifying federal firearms regulation.
184
 Similar “Firearms Freedom Act” 
legislation has been introduced in twenty-six more states.
185
 One state even 
prescribes criminal penalties for anyone who tries to enforce federal 
firearms laws in the state.
186
 Legislation passed in Missouri that was later 
vetoed by the governor would not only make it a crime for federal agents 
to try to enforce federal gun laws in Missouri—but it also criminalized 
publishing the names of gun owners.
187
 In all, state legislators have 
reportedly proposed more than 200 laws aiming to nullify federal firearms 
laws.
188
  
Many of the laws are modeled on the Montana Firearms Freedom Act, 
the brainchild of firearms rights advocate and shooting range equipment 
manufacturer Gary Marbut.
189
 Generally, the laws declare that firearms or 
ammunition manufactured within the state and remaining within state 
borders are not subject to federal regulation.
190
 The theory is that such 
firearms and parts are out of the reach of federal power to regulate under 
the Commerce Clause.
191
 The laws seek to suspend federal firearms 
registration and other regulations within state borders.
192
 The laws, if 
 
 
 183. Barak Y. Orbach et al., Arming States’ Rights: Federalism, Private Lawmakers, and the 
Battering Ram Strategy, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1161, 1171–76 (2010).  
 184. See sources cited supra note 7.  
 185. For a map of the legislative proposals see State by State, FIREARMS FREEDOM ACT (Apr. 27, 
2014), http://firearmsfreedomact.com/state-by-state, archived at http://perma.cc/XS5W-YHYC. 
 186. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-405 (2014). 
 187. Press Release, Office of Mo. Governor Jay Nixon, Gov. Nixon Signs Legislation Expanding 
Gun Rights, Vetoes Unconstitutional Nullification Bill (July 5, 2013), available at https://governor.mo 
.gov/news/archive/gov-nixon-signs-legislation-expanding-gun-rights-vetoes-unconstitutional-nullification, 
archived at http://perma.cc/P5NF-LB63; Associated Press, Missouri Governor Vetoes Bill that 
Nullified Federal Gun Laws, FOX NEWS (July 5, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/07/05/ 
missouri-governor-vetoes-bill-that-nullified-fed-gun-laws/, archived at http://perma.cc/6ETK-2L97. 
 188. Justine McDaniel et al., In States, a Legislative Rush to Nullify Federal Gun Laws, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/08/29/in-states-a-
legislative-rush-to-nullify-federal-gun-laws/, archived at http://perma.cc/JM6T-4U2W. 
 189. For more on Marbut see, e.g., Orbach et al., supra note 183, at 1176–78.  
 190. See sources cited supra note 7. 
 191. See, e.g., Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(giving history). 
 192. Id. 
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followed, would flout requirements that firearms dealers be federally 
licensed and run background checks on unlicensed buyers.
193
  
The Obama administration’s response to the challenge to federal 
firearms regulation was markedly different to the hospitality shown to 
state marijuana legalization laws. After the passage of Firearms Freedom 
Laws in the various states, the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives (ATF) distributed “Open Letter[s]” to all 
firearms licensees within each state.
194
 The ATF letters warned that the 
state law “conflicts with Federal firearms laws and regulations” and that 
“Federal law supersedes the [state Firearms] Act.”195 Dealers were 
instructed to continue to follow federal law.
196
 ATF agents also 
specifically warned Marbut, who was seeking to manufacture firearms free 
of federal regulation, that violations of federal law “could lead to . . . 
potential criminal prosecution.”197  
In response, Marbut, joined by the Montana Shooting Sports 
Association and the Second Amendment Foundation, sued Attorney 
General Eric Holder for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.
198
 The 
showdown in federal court rendered Montana’s experiment with nullifying 
federal firearms law short-lived. Just a year after the Montana law was 
enacted, a district court judge ruled that the federal government’s 
Commerce Clause authority extended to firearms regulation—even if the 
product did not cross state lines.
199
 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
conclusion that Congress can validly regulate firearms, even within the 
borders of a single state, and thus held that the Montana Firearms Freedom 
Act was preempted by federal law.
200
 Unlike in the recreational marijuana 
legalization context, the federal government’s firm response to the 
rebellious state laws led to timely clarification and invalidation of the 
decriminalization conflict before reliance could develop. As will be 
discussed in Part II, this contrast has important ramifications for the 
availability of a reliance defense.  
 
 
 193. For these federal requirements, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–22 (2012)).  
 194. See, e.g., supra note 8. 
 195. E.g., ATF Letter to Mont., supra note 8.  
 196. Id. 
 197. Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, No. CV-09-147-DWM-JCL, 2010 WL 3926029, at 
*1 (D. Mont. Aug. 31, 2010). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at *22. 
 200. Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975, 981–83 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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3. Deferred Action for Early Childhood Arrivals and Parents of U.S. 
Citizens or Permanent Residents 
Immigration is a third area rife with clashing worldviews and rebellion 
from an unlikely suspect—the President of the United States.201 A 
particularly divisive issue in immigration reform is whether to provide 
paths to legalization for undocumented immigrants—also termed 
amnesty.
202
 An estimated 11 million undocumented people in the United 
States could potentially benefit.203 The legalization/amnesty debate has 
sparked fights with opponents and proponents arguing in different moral 
registers.
204
 
Opponents are concerned with rewarding lawbreakers who jump the 
lines and flout the laws necessary to defend the nation and its limited 
resources against being overrun.
205
 Proponents argue there is a need to 
address the plight of a large underclass of undocumented people living in 
the United States with stunted prospects and dreams.
206
 Political 
 
 
 201. See Preston & Cushman, supra note 1, at A1 (reporting on President Obama’s decision to 
stop deporting young Americans notwithstanding Congressional inability to pass legalization 
legislation).  
 202. See, e.g., Bill Keller, Op-Ed., Selling Amnesty, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2013/02/04/opinion/keller-selling-amnesty.html?pagewanted=all (discussing debate); 
Michael A. Memoli et al., Senators Unveil Bipartisan Immigration Plan, but Opposition Looms, L.A. 
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/28/nation/la-na-immigration-20130129, 
archived at http://perma.cc/6JD9-JL6D (discussing cleavages); Karen Tumulty, Missteps of 1986 
Overhaul Haunt Immigration Debate, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2013, at A1, A12 (discussing debate and 
concerns over repeating problems with the 1986 amnesty conferred by the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act). 
 203. Keller, supra note 202. 
 204. See, e.g., id.; Rachel L. Swarns, Senate, in Bipartisan Act, Passes an Immigration Bill; Tough 
Fight Is Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2006, at A19 (discussing conflicts). 
 205. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, Remarks, Administrative Law: Immigration, Amnesty, and the 
Rule of Law, 2007 National Lawyers Convention of the Federalist Society, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1323, 
1329–31 (2008) (arguing amnesty would encourage illegal immigration and strain the nation’s 
financial resources); Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits of the Undocumented Immigrant: A Dialogue, 
44 GA. L. REV. 65, 141–43 (2009) (detailing arguments by immigration hardliners concerned about 
flooding by large masses of lawbreakers threatening stability and order); Hiroshi Motomura, 
Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2087 (2008) (discussing how legalization 
opponents frame concerns in rule of law terms); Letter from Edward Tuffy II, President, Local 2544, 
Nat’l Border Patrol Council, to Senator Jon Kyl 1–2 (May 24, 2007) (on file with author) (expressing 
concern over rewarding lawlessness, encouraging more massive illegal immigration, threatening 
security, and overburdening taxpayers). 
 206. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218–20 (1982) (Brennan, J.) (expressing concern over 
creation of a “‘shadow population’ of illegal migrants” and the “specter of a permanent caste of 
undocumented resident aliens”); Jennifer M. Chacón, Loving Across Borders: Immigration Law and 
the Limits of Loving, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 345, 358–76 (discussing adverse impacts of immigration law 
on families); Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, The Immigrant Rights Marches of 2006 and the 
Prospects for a New Civil Rights Movement, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 134–35 (2007) 
(exploring shared experience of bearing caste-like burdens); Legomsky, supra note 205, at 141–42 
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controversy stymied attempts at immigration reform in 2005,207 2006,208 
2007,209 2010,210 and is threatening to derail the latest attempt begun in 
2013.
211
 
One of the bills that died in Congress, popularly known as the DREAM 
Act, attempted to put a child’s hopeful face on the legalization/amnesty 
debate. A revival in 2009 of earlier legislation that had stalled, the 
DREAM Act focused on longtime residents of the United States who 
arrived as children before age sixteen.
212
 Under the proposed legislation, 
aliens under the age of thirty-five who have continuously resided in the 
United States for at least five years, shown “good moral character,” and 
completed high school, gotten a GED, or enrolled in college or the 
military can apply for conditional permanent residency status.
213
  
The legislation was re-introduced again in 2010 with tighter 
restrictions. Some of the revised eligibility requirements included a lower 
maximum age cap of twenty-nine, a requirement to have arrived in the 
United States before age fifteen, and a two-year wait before conditional 
permanent residency status.
214
 Again the bill stalled. Congress was battling 
over healthcare reform and was preoccupied with the midterm elections.
215
 
As President Obama acknowledged, there was little appetite for 
immigration reform in 2010.
216
 An attempt to fast-track immigration 
 
 
(explaining how proponents of softer approaches on immigration tend to empathize with imagery of 
suffering people); Clara Long, Recent Development, Crafting a Productive Debate on Immigration, 47 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167, 168–72 (2010) (presenting narratives of people impacted by immigration law 
and policy).  
 207. See Comprehensive Enforcement and Immigration Reform Act of 2005, S. 1438, 109th 
Cong. (1st Sess. 2005) (co-sponsored by Sens. John Cornyn and Jon Kyl); Secure America and 
Orderly Immigration Act, S. 1033, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005) (co-sponsored by Sens. John McCain, 
Ted Kennedy, and others). 
 208. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006) 
(sponsored by Sen. Arlen Specter). 
 209. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007) 
(sponsored by Sen. Harry Reid). 
 210. Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2011 (DREAM Act), S. 952, 
112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2010) (sponsored by Sen. Dick Durbin). 
 211. David Nakamura & Ed O’Keefe, Boehner: Immigration Reform Stalls Because GOP Has 
‘Widespread Doubt’ About Obama, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/boehner-immigration-reform-stalls-because-gop-has-widespread-doubt-about-obama/2014/02/ 
06/233b497a-8f55-11e3-b46a-5a3d0d2130da_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6TPZ-5D3B. 
 212. Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2009 (DREAM Act of 2009), S. 
729, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009). 
 213. Id. at § 4. 
 214. S. 952. 
 215. Rachel Weiner, How Immigration Reform Failed, Over and Over, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/01/30/how-immigration-reform-failed-
over-and-over/, archived at http://perma.cc/46JQ-5JLV.  
 216. Id.  
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reform legislation was decried as a “cynical political ploy” to curry favor 
among Hispanic voters.
217
 
When Senator Harry Reid reintroduced the bill in 2011, former crucial 
supporters such as Senators John McCain, Jon Kyl, John Cornyn, and 
Lindsey Graham withdrew support.
218
 The senators stated that 
enforcement provisions were needed to counterbalance amnesty.
219
 The 
timing was again sensitive. A presidential election was coming up in 2012 
and President Obama was seeking reelection. Immigration reform is an 
incendiary and perilous issue during elections, with the power to attract 
some key groups and infuriate others.
220
 
During the thick of campaign season, on June 15, 2012, President 
Obama announced that he was weary of waiting for Congress to act and 
that he would use executive action to achieve the DREAM Act’s goals.221 
President Obama told the nation about the bill and its limbo in 
Congress.
222
 He expressed frustration that a bipartisan bill was stonewalled 
when “the only thing that has changed, apparently, was the politics.”223 He 
told the nation that young undocumented people should not be punished 
“simply because of the actions of their parents—or because of the inaction 
of politicians.”224 He declared that “[i]n the absence of any action from 
Congress to fix our broken immigration system” he would use executive 
enforcement discretion to stop deporting the young people who would 
have been the beneficiaries of the DREAM Act.
225
 
In a dramatic move that elicited tears of joy and cheers from 
beneficiaries—as well as shock and dismay among opponents—President 
Obama declared: “Effective immediately, the Department of Homeland 
Security is taking steps to lift the shadow of deportation from these young 
 
 
 217. Id. 
 218. Karoun Demirjian, Harry Reid Reintroduces the DREAM Act, LAS VEGAS SUN (May 11, 
2011, 11:28 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/may/11/harry-reid-reintroduces-dream-
act/, archived at http://perma.cc/DQG4-HEUK. 
 219. Id. 
 220. See, e.g., Shanto Iyengar & Adam F. Simon, New Perspectives and Evidence on Political 
Communication and Campaign Effects, 51 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 149, 160 (2000) (identifying illegal 
immigration as a Republican issue more likely to raise the interest of voters); Daniel J. Tichenor, 
Navigating an American Minefield: The Politics of Illegal Immigration, 7 FORUM 1 (2009) (analyzing 
the incendiary politics of immigration). 
 221. President Obama Statement, supra note 38; Preston & Cushman, supra note 1, at A1; 
Stephen Dinan, Obama’s Immigration Test Run Raises Cheers, Alarm, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2013), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/14/presidents-immigration-test-run-raises-cheers-
alar/?page=all#pagebreak, archived at http://perma.cc/MHK7-AU5U. 
 222. President Obama Statement, supra note 38. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
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people.”226 President Obama told the nation—and DREAM Act hopefuls 
who had been waiting in limbo—that they could apply to the Department 
of Homeland Security to “request temporary relief from deportation 
proceedings and apply for work authorization.”227 The president’s decree 
was followed by a memorandum from the Secretary of Homeland Security 
to law enforcement agencies directing them to implement the president’s 
plan and defining eligibility criteria based on the DREAM Act as 
introduced in 2009.
228
 
Under the President’s program, called “Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA),” applicants must apply to the Department of Homeland 
Security. The application requires disclosure of the undocumented 
person’s location, list of addresses, schools, identity documents, and 
admissions regarding last prior entry and status at time of entry.
 229
 It takes 
great trust and hope to disclose such sensitive information, which might be 
used to hunt people down for deportation and could even be used as 
admissions in a criminal prosecution for unlawful entry.
230
 
The danger is amplified by the disclaimers surrounding the program. 
Tucked at the end of President Obama’s announcement, where disclaimers 
typically go, he warned the measure was “stopgap” and “temporary.”231 
The Secretary of Homeland Security’s memo contains a longer disclaimer 
at the end: “This memorandum confers no substantive right, immigration 
status or pathway to citizenship. Only the Congress, acting through its 
legislative authority, can confer these rights.”232 Because of the required 
disclosures, risks, and uncertainty, some attorneys who offer legal aid to 
hopeful applicants struggle with a dilemma about whether to advise 
pursuing DACA relief.
233
 Will hopeful applicants be paying application 
 
 
 226. Id. See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, Can Obama Write His Own Laws?, WASH. POST (Aug., 
15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles-krauthammer-can-obama-write-his-own-
laws/2013/08/15/81920842-05df-11e3-9259-e2aafe5a5f84_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
L8SS-YMMT (describing critiques). 
 227. President Obama Statement, supra note 38. 
 228. Napolitano Letter, supra note 9; USCIS DACA Consideration, supra note 9.  
 229. See, e.g., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., HOW DO I REQUEST CONSIDERATION 
OF DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (DACA) (June 2014), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Deferred%20Action%20for%20Childho
od%20Arrivals/daca_hdi.pdf (advising on the requirements for applying for deferred action).  
 230. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2012) (defining elements of crime of unlawful entry); FED. R. 
EVID. 801(d) (governing admissions by a declarant-witness and an opposing party’s statement). Cf. 
FED. R. EVID. 804 (b)(3)–(4) (governing statements against interest and statements of personal or 
family history). 
 231. President Obama Statement, supra note 38. 
 232. Napolitano Letter, supra note 9, at 3.  
 233. Interview with Angelica Chazaro, Supervising Attorney, Northwest Immigrants’ Rights 
Project (Jan. 15, 2014). 
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fees and neatly packaging their information on a platter for law 
enforcement officials who might later use the information against them?  
Yet eligible applicants are dubbed “DREAMers” for a reason.234 
Applicants recall crying in joy and relief at the President’s announcement 
thinking they finally had a chance to live a normal life.
235
 As eighteen-
year-old Xiomara Marin explained, “It’s something that I’ve wanted for 
life so I could move forward.”236 Despite the risks, hundreds of thousands 
of applicants have applied.
237
 As of February 16, 2014, more than 610,000 
applications have been accepted.
238
 For these DREAMers and more who 
are continuing to submit their sensitive personal information, the question 
of reasonable reliance is of critical importance.  
The scope and import of the question of reliance is growing even more 
because of President Obama’s November 2014 executive order extending 
deferred action to the parents of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent 
residents who have resided continuously in the United States since January 
1, 2010.
239
 The president’s order would allow an estimated 4 million 
unauthorized immigrants to apply for executive authorization to work in 
the United States and de-prioritize them for deportation.
240
 The executive 
order takes effect 180 days after November 20, 2014.
 241
   
 
 
 234. See, e.g., Stephen Dinan, High Rate of Approval for ‘Dreamers’ Vexes Critics of Immigration 
Reform, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/16/high-rate-
of-approval-for-dreamers-vexes-critics-o/ archived at http://perma.cc/BB32-YV2U. 
 235. Jenna Carlsson, My Word: Undocumented Immigrants Should Be Person of the Year, 
OAKLAND TRIB. (Dec., 6, 2012, 4:00 PM), http://www.insidebayarea.com/editorial/ci_22138051/my-
word-undocumented-immigrants-should-be-person-year, archived at http://perma.cc/DT5G-YLU7; 
Molly Young, Oregon DREAMers, Others Applaud Planned Deportation Relief for Young 
Undocumented Workers, Students, OREGONIAN (June 16, 2012, 6:38 AM), http://www.oregonlive. 
com/politics/index.ssf/2012/06/oregon_dreamers_others_applaud.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
7M4B-WYEZ. 
 236. Young, supra note 235. 
 237. Id. 
 238. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Number of I-821D, Consideration of Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals by Fiscal Year, Quarter, Intake, Biometrics and Case Status: 2012–2014 
First Quarter (Feb. 6, 2014), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/ 
Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/All%20Form%20Types/DACA/DACA-
06-02-14.pdf 
 239. See U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Executive Actions on Immigration (Dec. 5, 
2014), available at http://www.uscis.gov/immigrationaction#2 (discussing President Obama’s 
November 2014 deferred action for parents of U.S. citizens and permanent residents).  
 240. U.S. White House, Fixing the System: President Obama Is Taking Action on Immigration 
(Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/immigration/immigration-action#; 
Michael D. Shear, Obama, Daring Congress, Acts to Overhaul Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 
2014, at A1. 
 241. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., supra note 239.  
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II. PAIRED PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE WHEN RELIANCE DEFENSES SHOULD BE 
AVAILABLE 
As the contemporary dilemmas discussed in Part I illustrate, people 
plan their lives, hopes, and businesses around legalization laws and 
decrees.
242
 In the shadow of a decriminalization conflict, can people trust 
the law on the books or the promise of non-enforcement by the law 
enforcement officials charged with administering the laws? If people take 
actions now in reliance, will they face sanctions later? This question is of 
great import for many people and businesses, as well as the lawyers who 
advise them.
243
 This section argues that the crucial answer to the question 
depends on whether the law enforcement official charged with 
administering the criminalization regime expressly acquiesces in the 
competing legalization law or decree. 
A. Estoppel and Legality 
People or businesses seeking to bind the government to its statements 
often raise claims of equitable estoppel, or a variation known as 
entrapment by estoppel in the criminal context.
244
 Equitable estoppel 
against the government is a Loch Ness-like mythical creature, posited to 
exist and hunted by eager aspirants but rarely successfully glimpsed.
245
 
Estoppel claims typically involve erroneous advice given by the 
government officials, often in the civil context, such as advice on benefits 
eligibility.
246
 Claimants argue they acted in reliance on the advice and the 
government should be bound by it.
247
 
 
 
 242. See discussion of examples supra Part I.B.1–3. 
 243. Id. 
 244. E.g., United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Co., 411 U.S. 655, 670–74 (1973); Raley v. Ohio, 
360 U.S. 423, 437–40 (1959); United States v. Schafer, 625 F.3d 629, 637 (9th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Ramirez-Valencia, 202 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000); San Pedro v. United States, 79 F.3d 
1065, 1068–69 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lane, No. CR-12-01419-DGC, 2013 WL 3199841, at 
*8–*9 (D. Ariz. June 24, 2013); United States v. Washington, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1085, 1090–100 
(D. Mont. 2012).  
 245. See 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13.1, at 1101 (5th ed. 
2009) (“The Court has come close to saying that the government can never be equitably estopped 
based on a false or misleading statement of one of its agents no matter how much an individual has 
relied on that statement to her detriment or how reasonable her reliance.”). 
 246. E.g., Office Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 419–24 (1990) (benefits); Schweiker v. 
Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 788–89 (1981) (per curiam) (benefits); Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 
U.S. 380, 382–86 (1947) (federal insurance). See also, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 245, at 1101–02 
(discussing the tax example). 
 247. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 419–20; Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 332 U.S. at 384–85. 
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In the civil context, the standards to secure equitable estoppel against 
the government are dauntingly exacting. The statements by the 
government agent must clearly be within the scope of the official’s 
authority.
248
 If the governmental official exceeds the scope of his powers, 
such as the Secretary of War issuing bills without statutory authority, 
people relying to their detriment do not get relief.
249
 The Supreme Court 
has left open the possibility that “affirmative misconduct” by a 
government official may provide an exception allowing equitable 
estoppel.
250
 But when lower courts enthusiastically seized this possibility, 
the Supreme Court vigorously and repeatedly summarily reversed.
251
 
Because of the Supreme Court’s great reluctance to grant equitable 
estoppel—in the civil context, at least—lower courts have held that 
equitable estoppel against the government is an “extreme remedy” limited 
to the “extraordinary” or “extreme” cases where “justice and fair play 
require it.”252 In civil cases, the burden of establishing an equitable 
estoppel claim is so “daunting” and “heavy” that claimants sometimes do 
not even bother to bring them anymore.
253
 
In the criminal context, however, equitable estoppel against the 
government is relatively more feasible to obtain. The leading Supreme 
Court case in the area is United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial 
Chemical Corp. (PICCO).
254
 PICCO involved a criminal prosecution of a 
chemical corporation for discharging industrial refuse into the 
Monongahela River in violation of the Rivers and Harbors Act.
255
 The trial 
court refused to allow PICCO to present the defense that it had relied on 
regulations promulgated by the Army Corps of Engineers, which 
 
 
 248. The Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666, 680–83 (1868); Lee v. Munroe, 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch) 366, 368 (1813). 
 249. The Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 680–83. 
 250. E.g., INS v. Miranda 459 U.S. 14, 19 (1982) (per curiam); INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973) 
(per curiam). 
 251. See Richmond, 496 U.S. at 422: 
Courts of Appeals have taken our statements as an invitation to search for an appropriate case 
in which to apply estoppel against the Government, yet we have reversed every finding of 
estoppel that we have reviewed. Indeed, no less than three of our most recent decisions in this 
area have been summary reversals of decisions upholding estoppel claims. 
 252. E.g., Matamoros v. Grams, 706 F.3d 783, 794 (7th Cir. 2013); Guatay Christian Fellowship 
v. Cnty. of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 975–76 n.12 (9th Cir. 2011); Ellinger v. United States, 470 F.3d 
1325, 1336 n.9 (11th Cir. 2006); Moses.Com Sec., Inc. v. Comprehensive Software Sys., Inc., 406 
F.3d 1052, 1061 (8th Cir. 2005).  
 253. See, e.g., Ellinger, 470 F.3d at 1336 n.9 (noting the claimant did not expressly argue 
equitable estoppel “presumably because the burden of establishing an equitable estoppel claim against 
the government is so daunting”).  
 254. 411 U.S. 655 (1973). 
 255. Id. at 657–60. 
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interpreted the statutory prohibition on discharge as limited to deposits 
that would impede or obstruct navigation.
256
 Writing for the Court, Justice 
Brennan reversed the conviction holding that the trial court erred in 
prohibiting PICCO from presenting evidence on the issue of reliance.
257
 
He reasoned that PICCO “had a right to look to the Corps of Engineers’ 
regulations for guidance” because the Corps was the agency charged with 
administering the statute.
258
 He concluded that “to the extent that the 
regulations deprived PICCO of fair warning as to what conduct the 
Government intended to make criminal, we think there can be no doubt 
that traditional notions of fairness inherent in our system of criminal 
justice prevent the Government from proceeding with the prosecution.”259 
The rationale captures the fair notice and legality principles that make 
estoppel claims different in the criminal context. A fundamental principle 
of criminal law and due process is that people (or businesses) prosecuted 
must have fair warning of what is criminalized so they can conform their 
conduct to the law.
260
 The fundamental principle that criminal prohibitions 
must be expressed clearly and precisely before people can be punished is 
known as legality.
261
 Where governmental officials or criminal laws issue 
contradictory commands, people are deprived of fair notice.
262
  
The paired principles of fair notice and reliance mean that people 
cannot be convicted for doing something that law enforcers told them they 
could do.
263
 Another decision authored by Justice Brennan illustrates this 
point. In Raley v. Ohio, the Court reversed the contempt convictions of 
witnesses for refusing to testify before the Ohio Un-American Activities 
Commission.
264
 The witnesses were told by the Chairman of the Un-
American Activities Commission that they had a right to refuse to answer 
questions under the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.
265
 The witnesses actually no longer enjoyed a privilege 
against self-incrimination, however, because an Ohio statute gave 
 
 
 256. Id. at 659–60, 673–674. 
 257. Id. at 675. 
 258. Id. at 674. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438 (1959); United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176–77 
(1952).  
 261. For a discussion of various manifestations of legality principles in criminal law see, e.g., Paul 
H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 356–
73 (2005). 
 262. Cox v. Louisiana 379 U.S. 559, 571 (1965); Raley, 360 U.S. at 426–31. 
 263. Raley, 360 U.S. at 426. 
 264. Id. at 425–26. 
 265. Id. at 427.  
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transactional immunity for testimony, thereby removing the risk of 
incrimination from the testimony.
266
 The witnesses were therefore 
subsequently convicted for failing to answer the questions of the 
Commission.
267
 The Court reversed on the ground that to allow conviction 
“would be to sanction the most indefensible sort of entrapment by the 
State—convicting a citizen for exercising a privilege which the State 
clearly had told him was available to him.”268 On the same principle, the 
Court has also reversed the conviction of a protester for holding a 
demonstration in front of a courthouse, where police affirmatively told 
protesters they could be.
269
 
The principle that a state cannot convict someone for doing what 
officials said she could lawfully do is sometimes termed “entrapment by 
estoppel.”270 The term is misleading because the doctrine is different from 
the defense of entrapment, which is based on the principle that the job of 
law enforcement is to prevent crime and apprehend criminals, not “the 
manufacturing of crime” by “implant[ing] in the mind of an innocent 
person the disposition” to offend.271 Entrapment is a defense often raised 
in undercover investigations, where defendants claim the government 
lured them into committing a crime.
272
 Because entrapment is based on the 
notion that a defendant would not have committed a crime if the 
government had not induced him to do it, in many jurisdictions, a 
defendant predisposed to commit the crime is not entitled to an entrapment 
defense.
273
  
In contrast, the concerns behind an entrapment-by-estoppel defense, 
also known as a “public authority” defense, are reliance on the 
representations of the law or government officials and lack of fair notice 
about criminality.
274
 Entrapment by estoppel is “unintentional entrapment 
 
 
 266. Id. at 431–32. 
 267. Id. at 432. 
 268. Id. at 438. 
 269. Cox, 379 U.S. at 571–72.  
 270. See, e.g., Keathley v. Holder, 696 F.3d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting misleading nature of 
term). 
 271. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958) (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 
U.S. 435, 442 (1932)).  
 272. For a discussion, see, e.g., Bruce Hay, Sting Operations, Undercover Agents, and 
Entrapment, 70 MO. L. REV. 387, 387–88 (2005). 
 273. See, e.g., Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451–52 (recognizing the defense of entrapment and explaining 
the predisposition test). For an overview, see, e.g., Paul Marcus, Proving Entrapment Under the 
Predisposition Test, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 53 (1987); Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 
MINN. L. REV. 163 (1976). 
 274. Cox, 379 U.S. at 5; Raley, 360 U.S. at 426–30; United States v. Stallworth, 656 F.3d 721, 
725–27 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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by an official who mistakenly misleads a person into a violation of the 
law.”275 As fleshed out by lower courts since Raley and Cox, the 
entrapment-by-estoppel defense arises where a defendant reasonably relies 
on the active assurance of the lawfulness of her conduct by a government 
official with authority to interpret or enforce the law.
276
 Defendants 
generally must prove there is (1) affirmative misleading or erroneous 
advice by a government agent; (2) the agent is charged with administering, 
interpreting, or enforcing the law defining the crime; and (3) they actually 
and reasonably relied on the official’s statements.277  
While courts have allowed an estoppel defense in criminal cases, 
reliance in the shadow of a decriminalization conflict presents a 
challenging open question. The representations and reliance come in a 
different configuration than in typical entrapment-by-estoppel cases. The 
situation is more complicated than a mistake by the officials charged with 
administering the criminal law at issue. People are relying on a 
legalization regime by a different governmental authority than the one 
charged with administering the criminalization regime. Moreover, 
showing the reasonableness of reliance is a more difficult question where 
there is a competing criminalization regime.  
Indeed, even in the landmark PICCO case, Justice Brennan declined to 
opine on the reasonableness of the defendant corporation’s reliance on the 
regulations of the Army Corps when contradictory authority should have 
put the defendant on notice that it was wrong to rely upon the Corps’s 
guidance.
278
 PICCO ruled that reasonable reliance can be a defense, not 
whether the reliance in the case was reasonable on the facts.
279
 Justice 
Brennan left it to the district court to determine reasonableness in the first 
instance.
280
 Justice Blackmun and Justice Rehnquist would have gone 
further and simply ruled that reliance was not reasonable because the 
 
 
 275. United States v. Schafer, 625 F.3d 629, 637 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. 
Batterjee, 361 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 276. United States v. Bader, 678 F.3d 858, 886 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Hale, 685 F.3d 
522, 542 (5th Cir. 2012); Stallworth, 656 F.3d at 726–27; Schafer, 625 F.3d at 634–35.  
 277. E.g., Bader, 678 F.3d at 886. Sometimes the elements are broken down further. For example, 
in the Ninth Circuit, the defendant must show: “(1) an authorized government official, empowered to 
render the claimed erroneous advice, (2) who has been made aware of all the relevant historical facts, 
(3) affirmatively told him the proscribed conduct was permissible, (4) that he relied on the false 
information, and (5) that his reliance was reasonable.” Batterjee, 361 F.3d at 1216 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  
 278. 411 U.S. 655, 675 (1973). 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
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Court had earlier clearly held that the scope of the criminal prohibition 
included any pollutants, not just those that obstructed the waterways.
281
 
Defendants operating under a decriminalization conflict who have been 
prosecuted have not fared well thus far.
282
 For example in United States v. 
Schafer, Marion Fry, a doctor with breast cancer who used marijuana to 
alleviate pain, and her husband, an attorney, were convicted for cultivating 
marijuana.
283
 Their grow operation was in California, where it was legal to 
grow and possess marijuana to ease the pain of illness—under state, albeit 
not federal, law.
284
 When the couple began growing marijuana plants to 
treat Fry’s cancer pain, they contacted the sheriffs department to let them 
know and allowed the sheriffs to inspect their plants.
285
 Ultimately, the 
grow operation expanded from producing marijuana just for Fry’s pain to 
larger-scale production for sale.
286
 The DEA investigated them and the 
pair were federally prosecuted and convicted for conspiring to 
manufacture and distribute marijuana plants.
287
  
The couple wanted to assert an entrapment-by-estoppel defense and 
argue that they were lulled into believing their activity was legal.
288
 The 
trial court barred them from presenting the defense.
 289
 The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the preclusion, reasoning that the uncontradicted evidence 
showed that the defendants knew that marijuana was illegal under federal 
law.
290
 The court reasoned that defendants who know that their conduct is 
illegal under federal law cannot be misled to believe their conduct was 
lawful by state law or the actions of government officials.
291
 Therefore the 
court declined to determine whether the state law enforcement officials 
that the couple consulted could be viewed as working in cooperation with 
the federal government sufficiently to bind the federal government.
292
 
A crucial argument that Schafer did not have occasion to consider is an 
increasingly important issue today: What happens if officials charged with 
 
 
 281. Id. at 675–76 (Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966)). 
 282. E.g., United States v. Schafer, 625 F.3d 629, 637–39 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Washington, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1084, 1094–100 (D. Mont. 2012); Mont. Caregivers Ass’n v. 
United States, 841 F.Supp. 2d 1147, 1148–49 (D. Mont. 2012). 
 283. 625 F.3d at 633. 
 284. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2007). 
 285. Schafer, 625 F.3d at 633. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. at 633–35. 
 288. Id. at 637. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. at 638. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
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enforcing the criminalization regime acquiesce in the legalization of the 
proscribed conduct? At the time of the Schafer couple’s marijuana-
growing operation, the Ogden and Cole Memoranda and President 
Obama’s concurrent statements regarding deference to state marijuana 
regimes had not been released yet.
293
 The next section argues that this 
acquiescence by the governmental officials charged with enforcing the 
criminal law makes a crucial difference.  
B. Acquiescence and Reasonable Reliance 
Can reliance on legalization by rebellious state legislation or 
presidential decree ever be a defense if the criminalization regime remains 
in place? This question is more complicated than traditional estoppel-by-
entrapment cases because reliance is based on authority conflicting with, 
rather than interpreting, the law defining the offense.
294
  
On the one hand, people should be able to rely on legalization laws or 
decrees without having to parse their constitutionality like learned scholars 
versed in preemption and the separation of powers. As the Alabama 
Supreme Court memorably put it, to impose on people the burden of 
foreseeing how courts will construe a law’s validity would stretch the 
fiction that people know the law so far as to be “odious to all right and just 
thinking men.”295 The North Carolina Supreme Court similarly dismissed 
the notion that people should be wiser than the legislature that passed a 
law as “opposed to every idea of justice.” 296 Until a law is invalidated by a 
competent authority people “under every idea of justice and under our 
theory of government, ha[ve] a right to presume that the lawmaking power 
had acted within the bounds of the constitution.”297  
On the other hand, the existence of the criminalization and resulting 
risk of prosecution is no secret. How can reliance on legalization be 
reasonable if the criminalization is known and remains on the books? 
Abstracting and applying venerable old principles to new challenges, 
the answer is that reliance should be deemed reasonable where the 
officials charged with enforcing the criminal regime give people reason to 
rely on the legalization.
298
 When criminal statutes give “contradictory 
 
 
 293. See discussion supra notes 152–66. 
 294. Cf. United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp. (PICCO), 411 U.S. 655, 675 (1973) 
(contradictory regulation erroneously interpreting the scope of criminalization). 
 295. Cf. Brent v. State, 43 Ala. 297, 302 (1869). 
 296. State v. Godwin, 31 S.E. 221, 222 (N.C. 1898). 
 297. Id. 
 298. Cf. Cox v. Louisiana 379 U.S. 559, 571 (1965); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 426–30 (1959).  
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commands” they are “denied the force of criminal sanctions.”299 A 
criminal statute can on its face be explicit and clear—yet actions by the 
agency charged with its administration such as the promulgation of 
regulations suggesting a narrower scope of enforcement may mislead the 
defendant and give rise to a reliance defense.
300
 Due process demands 
sufficiently clear notice that sanctions will attach to conduct before people 
may be prosecuted for it.
301
 
Of course, passage of competing and subordinate legalization laws, 
such as the state marijuana or firearms nullification laws do not render pre-
existing criminalization unclear. The mere existence of a decriminalization 
conflict is not a defense because reliance must be reasonable.
302
 What 
makes reliance reasonable is the action of the officials or agency charged 
with enforcing the laws criminalizing the conduct.
303
  
The first two contemporary decriminalization controversies discussed 
in Part I.B.1–2 show two ends of a spectrum of official responses to a 
legalization conflict. As discussed in Part I.B.1, in the case of state 
marijuana decriminalization, the current presidential administration has 
expressly acquiesced—and even facilitated—state legalization efforts 
notwithstanding federal criminalization. In a 2013 memorandum to all 
U.S. Attorneys, the administration stated it would entrust the marijuana 
legalization states to “implement strong and effective regulatory and 
enforcement systems that will address the threat those state laws could 
pose to public safety, public health, and other law enforcement 
interests.”304 If states do so, then “enforcement of state law by state and 
local law enforcement and regulatory bodies” would “remain the primary 
means of addressing marijuana-related activity.”305  
Concurrently with the memorandum, President Obama told the nation 
that the state experiments in marijuana legalization should go forward.
306
 
Federal authorities have even issued guidance to facilitate access of 
 
 
 299. Raley, 360 U.S. at 438 (citing United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952)). 
 300. United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp. (PICCO), 411 U.S. 655, 659–60, 673–74 (1973). 
 301. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).  
 302. Cf. United States v. Schafer, 625 F.3d 629, 638 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding there was no 
reasonable reliance where the defendants knew that federal law criminalized their marijuana 
cultivation and sales). 
 303. Cf., e.g., PICCO, 411 U.S. at 675 (reliance defense may be possible despite clear statutory 
criminalization of defendant’s conduct because of the regulations of the agency tasked with enforcing 
the law); United States v. Bader, 678 F.3d 858, 885–88 (10th Cir. 2012) (looking to the conduct of the 
agency or officials charged with enforcing the law defining the offense). 
 304. 2013 Cole Memorandum, supra note 158, at 2. 
 305. Id. at 3.  
 306. Remnic, supra note 162, at 26–27. 
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marijuana businesses to banks to store their profits.
307
 Moreover, the 
emerging paradigm of state marijuana legalization is not mere exemption 
from criminalization. Rather, businesses have the affirmative imprimatur 
of licensing and taxation from the states.
308
 The combination of federal 
acquiescence—even encouragement—and the active imprimatur of state 
licensing render reliance reasonable.  
In contrast, reliance is not reasonable where federal authorities have 
refused to acquiesce in state legalization. This is illustrated by the swift 
federal reaction to the Firearms Freedom Acts passed or pending across 
the nation.
309
 Because of the federal response, the state laws have been 
declared preempted by federal law and invalidated before people and 
businesses could rely to their detriment.
310
 Reliance on nullification laws 
can hardly be reasonable where longstanding law clearly imposes contrary 
obligations and law enforcers give no reason to think that sanctions will 
not be forthcoming. States cannot by fiat render clear and controlling 
criminalization unclear—but the conduct of agencies and officials charged 
with administering the criminalization regime can change the equities. 
The first two examples set the poles of the spectrum of when a reliance 
defense may or should not be available. The third example is the most 
vexing. As discussed in Part I.B.3, in just a short time, hundreds of 
thousands of young undocumented immigrants have emerged from the 
shadows and given sensitive information regarding their identity, location, 
and last unlawful entry in reliance on President Obama’s grant of deferred 
action. Even more people are waiting to emerge in light of President 
Obama’s recent announcement of deferred action for parents of U.S. 
citizens. The executive actions may impact the lives as many as 5 million 
people—almost double the amount of people who benefitted under the 
1986 amnesty law.
311
 Can the information given under a program designed 
to offer clemency later be used against people who emerge from the 
shadows in reliance if the political winds or presidential regime change?  
 
 
 307. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 308. See supra notes 126, 151 and accompanying text (discussing Colorado and Washington 
schemes). See also Stannard, supra note 151 (noting that only five states, including Connecticut, 
require state regulated cultivation and dispensaries). 
 309. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 310. Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975, 982–83 (9th Cir. 2013) (invalidating 
Montana’s law on preemption grounds). 
 311. Julia Preston, Obama Plan Could Grant Papers to Millions, at Least for Now, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 16, 2014, at A23.  
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The issue is particularly tough because there is no affirmative conferral 
of legalization by any democratically enacted law.
312
 Rather DREAMers 
are relying on executive action taken because of legislative inaction.
313
 
Moreover, the context is immigration rather than criminal law, where 
heightened protections apply.
314
 The more complicated configuration of 
the reliance dilemma should not obscure the fundamental principles at 
stake, however.  
The chief enforcer of immigration law dramatically announced he was 
going “to lift the shadow of deportation from these young people”—at 
least temporarily.
315
 Of course, one administration’s decision on how to 
exercise enforcement discretion does not prevent a new enforcer-in-chief 
from wielding discretion differently—or even prevent the president from 
changing his mind. But can the information elicited from DREAMers 
lured by the promise to apply for the amnesty later be used against them in 
deportation or criminal proceedings?  
It would offend fundamental principles of justice if the promises of the 
official charged with enforcing the law were the bait in a trap to secure 
information facilitating later sanctions.
316
 The Supreme Court has 
recognized that the old distinction between civil deportation and criminal 
penalties is vanishingly thin.
317
 As the landscape of immigration law has 
dramatically changed, deportation has become “intimately related to the 
criminal process” 318 and “an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most 
important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen 
defendants who plead guilty to specific crimes.”319 At bottom, when 
people disclose information to the official charged with enforcing the 
regime of sanctions, they are relying on the offer of clemency.  
Indeed, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services advises applicants 
for deferred action that the information they disclose “is protected from 
disclosure”320 to immigration enforcement agencies for removal purposes 
except in cases involving “public safety threats, criminals, and aliens 
 
 
 312. See President Obama Statement, supra note 38 (announcing executive action because of 
legislative inaction). 
 313. Id. 
 314. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 315. President Obama Statement, supra note 38. See, e.g., Young, supra note 235 (describing 
tears of joy); Krauthammer, supra note 226 (describing critiques). 
 316. Cf., e.g., Raley, 360 U.S. at 437–40 (holding that officials cannot lull defendants into conduct 
and then use that conduct against them); Brent v. State, 43 Ala. 297, 301 (1869) (similar). 
 317. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360–66 (2010). 
 318. Id. at 365. 
 319. Id. at 364 (internal footnotes deleted). 
 320. USCIS FAQs, supra note 10 (answering question 19).  
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engaged in fraud.”321 Of course, this does not mean people coming 
forward cannot later be deported if found ineligible or if the regime 
changes.
322
 Rather, principles of estoppel and reliance simply mean that 
information people disclosed in reliance on a program promising 
temporary clemency cannot be used to sanction them.  
III. MAIN POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS AND ANSWERS 
The prior sections sought to show how decriminalization conflicts 
require updating traditional doctrines on mistakes, estoppel, and reliance 
to tackle modern challenges. When governing authorities fracture over 
whether to permit or prohibit activity and give conflicting messages, the 
governed should not become casualties of the conflict. A limited reliance 
defense should be available when governmental actors in charge of the 
criminalization regime expressly acquiesce in the competing legalization. 
In such cases, reliance is reasonable and estoppel is required lest people or 
businesses be lulled by the statements of actors charged with 
administering the law into reliance only to be ensnared into a trap of 
sanctions.  
Recognizing any reliance defense at all may seem objectionable. After 
all, as illustrated in Part I.B.1–3, decriminalization conflicts tend to arise 
from rebellious action in disagreement with the controlling criminalization 
status quo. Why should such rebellion confer the ability to do activity that 
is prohibited just because officials charged with enforcing the 
criminalization regime happen to think the rebellion might be a good idea? 
This section addresses two clusters of potential objections. One arises 
from concern over legitimizing and amplifying governmental lawlessness. 
Another arises from concern over the risks of giving the governed a 
normative choice of law—deciding whether to follow the norms 
embedded in criminal law or not—and the risk of strategic gamesmanship 
to get around controlling criminal law.   
 
 
 321. Memorandum from the U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. (Nov. 7, 2011), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/NTA%20
PM%20%28Approved%20as%20final%2011-7-11%29.pdf. 
 322. See USCIS FAQS, supra note 10 (“This policy, which may be modified, superseded, or 
rescinded at any time without notice, is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create 
any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by law by any party in any administrative, 
civil, or criminal matter.”).  
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A. Governmental Lawlessness 
A potential objection to recognizing a reliance defense is rewarding 
governmental lawlessness twice over. The first form of lawlessness is the 
legalization despite continuing criminalization. The second form of 
lawlessness is the seeming abdication by officials charged with enforcing 
the criminalization laws of their duties when they acquiesce to the 
legalization.
323
  
The critique may have particular resonance with the growing number 
of people concerned with the use of executive action or nonenforcement to 
accomplish what Congress refuses to do.
324
 As the illustrations in Part 
I.B.1–3 show, President Obama has been a major catalyst for the creation 
of reliance. His administration has been the most hospitable in history to 
state experiments at legalizing marijuana notwithstanding federal 
criminalization. When Congress declined to enact the DREAM Act, he 
used executive action to achieve the goals of the DREAM Act. The 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program has been accused of 
constituting presidential “nullification” of duly enacted immigration law 
and termed “lawless,” “brazen Obama instant-amnesty.”325 The deferred 
action plan for parents of U.S. citizen children has sparked further furor, 
with Congressional opponents vowing to “fight the president tooth and 
nail” through legal challenges, funding measures and other strategies.326 
Seventeen states are suing the United States and federal immigration 
officials contending that the President’s decisions to “unilaterally suspend 
the immigration laws as applied to 4 million of the 11 million 
 
 
 323. Cf., e.g., Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 724, 728–31 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (discussing 
lawsuit by Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents challenging the memorandum 
ordering them to conform to the Deferred Action for Early Childhood Arrivals program arguing they 
are being directed to “violate federal law and to violate their oaths to uphold and support federal law”). 
 324. Stephen Dinan, Agents Weigh Appeal in Deportation Policy Fight, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 2, 
2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/1/ice-agents-weigh-appeal-in-deportation-policy 
-figh/print/, archived at http://perma.cc/EW5U-G265; Krauthammer, supra note 226. 
 325. See Dinan, supra note 324 (quoting Kris Kobach, Kansas Secretary of State); D.A. King, 
GOP-Run Legislature Should End State’s Issuance of Driver’s Licenses to Illegals and Put ‘Official 
English’ on Ballot, MARIETTA DAILY J. (Jan. 5, 2014), http://www.mdjonline.com/view/full_story/ 
24334187/article-GOP-run-legislature-should-end-state-s-issuance-of-driver-s-licenses-to-illegals-and-
put--Official-English--on-ballot, archived at http://perma.cc/E65M-SLT9 (decrying “the lawless 
Obama regime”); David A. Martin, A Lawful Step for the Immigration System, WASH. POST (June 24, 
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-lawful-step-for-the-immigration-system/2012/06/ 
24/gJQAgT0O0V_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3KM5-XQL7 (summarizing and addressing 
critiques). 
 326. Preston, supra note 311, at A23. 
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undocumented immigrants in the United States” violates the Take Care 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act.
327
 
To put the criticism in perspective, President Obama is certainly not 
alone in using presidential directives or enforcement discretion to 
accomplish policy objectives.
328
 For example, the administration under 
President George W. Bush declined to regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
under the Clean Air Act and dramatically decreased the number of 
antidiscrimination law enforcement actions.
329
 After the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, President Bush used presidential power to create a 
whole new legal system to try enemy combatants.
330
 President Bill Clinton 
used presidential memoranda to lift limitations on hospitals receiving 
federal funding and nongovernmental organizations receiving U.S. aid 
from offering abortion counseling.
331
  
The answer to the allegation of rewarding governmental lawlessness is 
that recognizing a reliance defense is about not punishing people for the 
conflicts of their lawmakers rather than rewarding officials. The political 
process punishes or rewards officials such as the presidents who “go 
rogue” or opt not to enforce the laws.332 Public opinion and partisan 
politics serve as checks on the president and other law enforcers.
333
 
Opponents will decry nonenforcement or pursuit of new policy by 
executive fiat as “lawless” and voters can decide whether they agree.334 
Law enforcement agents may even sue the boss directing them not to 
enforce the law, as several Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
agents have done by suing the Secretary of Homeland Security.
335
 Media 
will amplify and broadcast the political theater into the living rooms of 
viewer-voters, who ultimately decide on the dispute at the voting booths. 
 
 
 327. Complaint, Texas v. United States, Case No. 1:14-CV-00254 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2014).  
 328. For a discussion, see, e.g., Phillip J. Cooper, The Law: Presidential Memoranda and 
Executive Orders: Of Patchwork Quilts, Trump Cards, and Shell Games, 31 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 
126 (2001); Parker Rider-Longmaid, Comment, Take Care that the Laws Be Faithfully Litigated, 161 
U. PA. L. REV. 291, 297–302 (2012); Michael Sant’Ambrogio, The Extra-Legislative Veto, 102 GEO. 
L.J. 351, 355–56 (2014); Jessica M. Stricklin, Comment, The Most Dangerous Directive: The Rise of 
Presidential Memoranda in the Twenty-First Century as a Legislative Shortcut, 88 TULANE L. REV. 
397, 404–07 (2013). 
 329. For a discussion, see, e.g., Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 328, at 355, 372–75. 
 330. See, e.g., ANDREW RUDALEVIGE, THE NEW IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 10–11 (2005); Jonathan 
Mahler, After the Imperial Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008 at MM42. 
 331. Cooper, supra note 328, at 126. 
 332. Krauthammer, supra note 226. 
 333. For a discussion in the foreign affairs context, see, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. 
Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 
1108–09, 1138 (2013). 
 334. Id. at 1138. 
 335. Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 737 (N.D. Tex. 2013).. 
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Moreover, if sufficiently perturbed, Congress can use the power of the 
purse to counteract perceived lawless behavior. Indeed, congressional 
opponents to President Obama’s deferred action program proposed an 
amendment aimed at blocking the program through forbidding funding.
336
 
The measure passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 234-201.
337
 
While the defunding amendment stalled in the Senate, legislators are 
introducing new measures protesting the President’s nonenforcement 
actions.
338
 The political process and the media mediate this check too. 
Though the defunding amendment was buried in appropriations 
legislation, some members of Congress who voted in favor of defunding 
the deferred action program found themselves subject to sit-ins by people 
in their home district.
339
 Congressional opponents of the defunding bill 
also took their case to the people, publicizing the “poison pill” amendment 
to the appropriations bill.
340
  
Offering a reliance defense does not affect these important checks on 
official behavior. Rather, a reliance defense simply ensures that ordinary 
people and businesses do not become cannon fodder in the crossfire. 
When policy battles spill into conflicting law, the burden should not be on 
the governed to predict or adjudicate which side should trump.
341
 People 
may not be punished for commands rendered ambiguous by 
contradiction.
342
 When it comes to levying criminal sanctions, the burden 
 
 
 336. Lowey & Price Slam Poison Pill Amendment to HS Appropriations Act, CONG. DOCS, June 6, 
2013, available at 2013 WLNR 13955244 [hereinafter Lowy & Price Slam Poison Pill]. 
 337. Id. 
 338. See, e.g., Press Release, Congressman Veasey’s Statement on House Republican 
Leadership’s Continued Attack Against DREAMers, Mar. 12, 2014, http://veasey.house.gov/media-
center/press-releases/congressman-veasey-s-statement-on-house-republican-leadership-s (noting that 
the “poison pill” amendment stalled in the Senate but new measures are pending).  
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NEWS (June 25, 2013), http://www.mysanantonio.com/community/northeast/news/article/Our-Star-
Spangled-Banner-waves-for-all-of-us-4621693.php, archived at http://perma.cc/DJ2-PDFT; Brian 
Slattery, Immigration Reformers Sit in at McIntyre’s Leland Office, BRUNSWICK BEACON (July 24, 
2013, 12:52 PM), http://www.brunswickbeacon.com/content/immigration-reformers-sit-mcintyre%E2 
%80%99s-leland-office, archived at http://perma.cc/49PZ-2LB8. 
 340. Lowey & Price Slam Poison Pill, supra note 336. 
 341. See, e.g., State v. Godwin, 31 S.E. 221, 222 (N.C. 1898) (holding that to require people to be 
wiser than their legislature in predicting the constitutionality of laws is “opposed to every idea of 
justice”). 
 342. See Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438 (1959) (“A State may not issue commands to its 
citizens, under criminal sanctions, in language so vague and undefined as to afford no fair warning of 
what conduct might transgress them. Inexplicably contradictory commands in statutes ordaining 
criminal penalties have, in the same fashion, judicially been denied the force of criminal sanctions.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
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is on the government to clearly express what the law is.
343
 A fundamental 
principle of construction in the criminal context is that “ambiguity should 
be resolved in favor of lenity.”344  
More controversially, in a time of political paralysis, change from the 
status quo may sometimes be salutary. Rather than lawlessness, policy 
entrepreneurship pursued by states or the president may be a way to 
prevent stagnation due to legislative gridlock or to reflect popular 
sentiments about which laws are priorities for directing limited resources 
toward vigorous enforcement and which are not. As for rebellious state 
legalization, such acts may even jolt federal lawmakers into action and call 
attention to fresh alternatives to problematic paradigms. For example, 
amid state debates over marijuana decriminalization, Congress considered 
reforming federal marijuana law to conform to the state legislation.
345
 
Lawmakers have also pushed President Obama to consider reclassifying 
marijuana from its current status as a Schedule I controlled substance.
346
 
One need not subscribe to the view that a little rebellion is a good thing, 
however, to agree that people and business should not be casualties of the 
culture wars. 
B. Giving the Governed a Normative Choice of Law 
Another potential objection may be the risk of undermining the moral 
force of the criminal law by allowing people to choose whether they wish 
to obey the criminal prohibition or rely on the legalization. As illustrated 
by the decriminalization conflicts discussed in Part I.B.1–3, the dilemmas 
arise from cultures and social norms at war. When people follow a 
particular regime, they thus make a normative choice of law—they are 
choosing a side. Objectors may be concerned that allowing people to 
choose sides poses risks of both undermining the criminal law’s 
expressive force and allowing strategic gamesmanship to get around 
controlling law. 
Criminal law expresses society’s normative values.347 By signaling 
societal values and norms and expressing moral condemnation for certain 
 
 
 343. See, e.g., Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (“[A]mbiguity concerning the 
ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.”). 
 344. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955). 
 345. Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2011, H.R. 2306, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). 
See also, e.g., Liz Navratil, Bill Would Give States Right to Regulate Pot, DENV. POST, June 24, 2011, 
at B3 (discussing bill). 
 346. Kovaleski, supra note 67, at A10. 
 347. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 362 
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conduct, law shapes behavior.
348
 People who search for clever ways to get 
around the societal norms embedded in criminal law are viewed as morally 
culpable actors and in the context of traditional reasonable mistake-of-law 
doctrine, courts have not been hospitable to granting excuses.
349
 Because 
of the utility of law’s expressive function in shaping behavior and 
communicating norms, people may be concerned about diluting the 
message by granting excuses based on a contradictory legalization regime. 
If criminal law becomes a choice rather than a command, why should 
anyone obey or respect the norms? 
Moreover, offering a normative choice of law also poses the risk of 
strategic gamesmanship to get around controlling criminal law that one 
finds inconvenient to one’s self-interest. Criminal law binds people to act 
in accord with a vision of societal good despite their own vices, self-
interest, or personal predilections. Evasion of the law is a recurring 
challenge in criminal law.
350
 Why give lawbreakers more avenues to 
dodge the normative vision of moral and social good embedded in the 
criminal law? 
Gamesmanship to get around the law is an endemic problem 
throughout criminal law,
351
 but the scope of risk also is narrowed by only 
recognizing a reliance defense if there is affirmative acquiescence. 
Governmental actors charged with administering the criminal law are 
unlikely to acquiesce in a conflicting legalization regime unless there is a 
good reason to do so, such as the criminalization regime no longer 
reflecting societal norms. For political actors to take the risk of expressly 
acquiescing, the norm erosion has already occurred. Recognizing a 
reliability defense simply ensures that in such compelling circumstances 
people will not be the casualties of the contradictory commands sent by 
conflicting laws and governmental actors in a time of normative transition.  
Moreover, like rebellious legislation that triggers dialogue and 
introduces fresh ideas, a little norm entrepreneurship may be a good thing. 
The norms embedded in old criminal laws may no longer match societal 
values.
352
 Yet the laws linger on the books not because people agree but 
 
 
(1997); Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 340 
(2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2031–36 
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because decriminalization is hard to achieve because of the risk to 
legislators of looking soft on crime.
353
 The enactment of competing 
legalization laws may show popular frustration with stagnation.
354
  
Of course, rebellious decriminalization may just be a narrowly shared 
regional view or attempt to get around controlling criminal law rather than 
the sign of a major norm shift. In that case, however, it is unlikely that 
governmental actors accountable to a national constituency would 
acquiesce in the competing legalization scheme. The swift response to the 
firearms freedom acts discussed in Part I.B.2 offers an example of states 
whose vision is not widespread enough to be reflected in the ideology of 
nationally elected law enforcers. Recognizing a reliance defense only in 
cases of affirmative acquiescence by the governmental actors tasked with 
enforcing the criminal laws thus limits the risks of norm entrepreneurship. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article addressed an open question of major pressing import for 
people and businesses operating in the shadow of decriminalization 
conflicts. Can reliance on legalization laws or decrees ever be a defense 
when criminalization laws remain on the books? The question is of great 
import in the era of rebellious decriminalization by states and even by the 
president.
355
 Just to take a few examples, legalization conflicts have arisen 
in the context of marijuana, guns, and immigration.
356
 People, businesses, 
banks, and the lawyers who advise them are all in search of answers about 
the risks they face if they rely on the legalization.
357
  
This Article addressed the question of whether reliance defenses may 
be available based on a decriminalization conflict. The issue already is 
being litigated in the courts and more cases are likely to follow.
358
 Under 
the rule elucidated in the Article, a defense should be available where the 
governmental actors with the duty to administer the criminalization regime 
acquiesce in the competing legalization regime.
359
 The recent and explicit 
 
 
 353. See supra note 70. 
 354. See, e.g., discussion supra Part I.B.1.a (discussing growing critiques regarding the 
consequences and disparate impact of marijuana criminalization). 
 355. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 7, 9, 126, 158. 
 356. See discussion of examples supra Part I.B.1–3. 
 357. See, e.g., USCIS FAQs, supra note 10 (discussing the frequently asked question about 
whether information revealed by people applying for deferred action can be used against the petitioner 
and the petitioner’s family); Southall, supra note 1, at A18 (detailing search for answers by financial 
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 358. See cases cited supra note 16. 
 359. See discussion supra Part II. 
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acquiescence by the federal law enforcers in state marijuana legalization is 
used to illustrate this point.
360
 In contrast, the swift federal reaction 
challenging the validity of firearms regulation nullification laws provides 
an example of where no reliance defense would be available. The difficult 
question of whether the sensitive information disclosed by DREAMers 
applying for executive enforcement clemency may later be used against 
them in a removal or prosecution is a test of the bounds of the principle.
361
 
The Article concludes that conduct engaged in, or information 
disclosed, during the period of the legalization and acquiescence cannot be 
the basis for a criminal prosecution. A reliance defense should be 
available. Of course, political regime changes may lead to suspension of 
acquiescence. After such a change, there can no longer be reasonable 
reliance because controlling criminal law governs and there is no longer 
acquiescence by the enforcers of the controlling criminal regime upon 
which people may rely. Unless and until there is such a change, however, 
people and businesses should be able to rely on decriminalization laws and 
acquiescence in such decriminalization by the enforcers of the competing 
criminalization laws. 
Allowing a reliance defense may rouse concerns of legitimizing 
lawlessness and encouraging strategic gamesmanship to get around 
controlling criminal law.
362
 But recognizing a reliability defense only in 
the compelling circumstances where the official administering the criminal 
law actively acquiesces to the legalization scheme limits the force of such 
concerns. Rebellious legalization coupled with acquiescence is only likely 
to arise in times of cultural change where the criminalization on the books 
no longer reflects the norms on the ground. Otherwise the risks of 
acquiescence will be too great and voters will punish the political actors 
accordingly. In such times of legal, cultural, and normative transition, 
people and businesses should not be punished for the mixed messages sent 
by the legalization conflict and the acquiescence of governmental actors. 
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